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Introduction 
Speaking to a U.S. Congressional committee in February 2003, 
American Medical Association (AMA) president-elect Donald 
Palmisano described a medical liability “crisis” bearing down on 
physicians.1 Medical malpractice insurance premiums are at 
“unprecedented levels,” he said.2 Health centers are closing.3 Patients 
are leaving their state to find care.4 Emergency departments are losing 
staff.5 Physicians can no longer afford—or even find—liability 
insurance necessary to practice.6 This is occurring, Palmisano said, 
because “premiums are spiking across all specialties.”7 
The concern over premium prices continues today, with 
physicians and politicians alike crying foul over what they perceive to 
be the escalating and debilitating cost of medical malpractice 
insurance. This perception has helped generate the impetus for dozens 
of federal and state legislative proposals aiming to curb what many 
 
1. Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th 
Cong. 68 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Donald J. 
Palmisano, President-elect, American Medical Association). The AMA 
has been one of the main groups that advocates for legal changes to 
make it more difficult for injured patients to recover compensation from 
physicians in lawsuits and to cap the amount of their compensation if 
courts find physicians liable. In advocating for such changes, the AMA 
has asserted the following position in public statements and testimony 
before Congress: (1) the cost of malpractice insurance has risen steadily 
and unabatedly; (2) that high premiums threaten the economic viability 
of medical practice and thereby precipitate a crisis; and (3) that 
malpractice premiums cause physicians to either stop practicing 
medicine or relocate to states solely in order to obtain malpractice 
insurance at lower cost. 
2. Id. at 70. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 69. 
5. Id. at 70.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 71. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
165 
sense are out-of-control costs. In the 108th and 109th U.S. Congresses 
alone, twenty-six bills were introduced to address this “rise in 
malpractice premiums.”8 These bills sought to change the rules of tort 
liability for medicine, to provide tax credits for premiums as relief, 
and to establish a commission to investigate the reasons that caused 
the rise in premiums, among other actions.9 Palmisano and the AMA 
joined with other groups to advocate for such legislation. In fact, the 
AMA website even includes a map indicating states in crisis, 
testimonials, and articles.10  
Many of these bills, however, use caps to limit patient recovery 
and physician liability.11 Rather than focusing on the prevalence of 
malpractice itself, much of this legislation challenges a patient’s right 
to recover and leaves many of these patients vulnerable, especially 
those without income, such as the retired, homemakers, and children. 
Even if malpractice premiums are indeed high, other less damaging 
and more effective options exist with which to counteract high 
premiums. They include reducing the incidence of medical injury or 
finding other ways to pay for insurance or compensate injured 
patients. 
“Malpractice lawsuits are the compensation tool that we have,” 
wrote Tom Baker in his 2005 book, The Medical Malpractice Myth.12 
 
8. In the 108th Congress, the bills were H.R. 1116, 108th Cong. (2003); 
H.R. 1124, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1158, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 
321, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1374, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1178, 108th 
Cong. (2003); H.R. 4124, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 446, 108th Cong. 
(2003); H.R. 447, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 485, 108th Cong. (2003); 
H.R. 1044, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1249, 108th Cong. (2003); and S. 
352, 108th Cong. (2003); in the 109th Congress, they were: H.R. 2657, 
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2400, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2291, 109th 
Cong. (2005); H.R. 2399, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 354, 109th Cong. 
(2005); S. 367, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 366, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 
2731, 109th Cong. (2005), and S.1012, 109th Cong. (2005). Since then 
bills have been introduced to limit damage awards rather than to cap 
premiums. See H.R. 5480, 110th Cong. (2008); Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3459, 111th 
Cong. (2009); S. 2662, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1734, 111th Cong. (2009); 
S. 1099, 112th Cong. (2011); and H.R. 4106, 113th Cong. (2014). 
9. See note 8 supra and accompanying text. 
10. AM. MED. ASSOC., America’s Medical Liability Crisis Map (on file with 
the author). 
11. See, e.g., David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries 
Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 
1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 38 (2007). 
12. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 111 (2005); for another 
leading synthesis on medical malpractice, see FRANK A. SLOAN & 
LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008); for a collection of 
interesting contemporary analyses, see generally WILLIAM M. SAGE & 
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“It would be a terrible mistake to make that tool harder to use 
without giving people something better in its place.”13 Not only would 
this legislation make lawsuits more difficult for plaintiffs, but the bills 
do not address the real source of the problems that they intend to 
solve. Premiums are not rising as claimed and even if they were, other 
factors are contributing to the plight of physicians. As Baker aptly 
titled his book, the medical malpractice “crisis” is more myth than 
fact.14 
Part I of this Article examines how this myth began and the 
proposed legislative remedies that it spawned. Part II shows that junk 
data has been used to support legislation while introducing more 
reliable data bearing on these issues. Part III describes other factors 
that are rarely mentioned, but that have important effects on the cost 
of medical practice and physician income. If doctors are truly closing 
up shop, then malpractice insurance premiums are not the cause. Part 
IV then examines one AMA-declared “crisis state” to see if there are 
indeed crises in some selected states, even if there is no crisis 
nationally. As this Part shows, there are none; rather, the study of 
individual states reveals that premiums rise and fall cyclically, that 
recent premium increases reflect these cycles, and that rates will 
probably fall as they have in the past whenever there has been an 
increase in rates. This Article concludes by offering insight into why 
physicians continue to perceive a crisis despite the data presented and 
what the future may hold for reform. 
I. The Perpetual Crisis 
The conventional wisdom today suggests that malpractice 
premiums are crushing practices and that the appropriate response is 
to restrict compensation for injured patients. For example, in 2006, 
U.S. Senate leaders introduced the Medical Care Access Protection 
Act and the Healthy Babies Access to Care Act in order to reduce the 
cost of liability insurance.15 The sponsors of the measure intended to 
drive down the cost of premiums by capping malpractice 
compensation under the assumption that insurance rates are 
increasing.16 To do so, the bills prohibited punitive damage awards 
 
ROGAN KERSH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE 
SYSTEM (2006). 
13. BAKER, supra note 12, at 111. 
14. Id. 
15. Medical Care Access Protection Act of 2006, S. 22, 109th Cong. § 8 
(2006); Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act, S. 244, 
110th Cong. §8 (2007). 
16. S. 22; S. 244. 
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that in excess of two and a half times the economic loss or $250,000, 
whichever is greater.17  
To justify such bills, legislators and physicians across the country 
depict a devastating scenario: “For years, the price of medical 
malpractice insurance has soared to record breaking levels,” said 
Representative Juan Hinojosa (Texas) in May 2005.18 “Medical school 
students are no longer interested in specialties and sub-specialties 
because of the yearly price they must pay to simply practice their 
craft.”19 In Illinois, according to the AMA, “it is a simple fact that the 
state’s out of control legal system has driven insurance premiums sky-
high and forced high-risk specialists, including neurosurgeons and 
obstetrician-gynecologists, to restrict services, retire early and leave 
the state. . . . Anyone driving through the state could lose their life 
because of this crisis.”20 New York State Senator John Flanagan, who 
sponsored legislation in 2008 that would decrease the amount of 
liability insurance needed by physicians to practice, stated that 
“Malpractice insurance rates are pushing doctors out of our state.”21 
In January 2003, U.S. Representative Peter DeFazio proposed a 
federal commission to examine the causes of “skyrocketing 
malpractice insurance premiums.”22 DeFazio’s home state of Oregon is 
one of twenty in a medical liability crisis, according to the AMA.23 
Such states, said the AMA, reflect a national trend in which patients 
are losing access to care due to physicians retiring early, relocating to 
other states, and restricting services, such as no longer delivering 
babies or performing high-risk surgeries.24  
As it is often argued, all this is occurring because malpractice 
insurance premiums are spiking, as they did in the 1970s. During that 
time, a flood of state legislation attempted to stem the costs of 
insurance through reforms of malpractice liability law. That 
 
17. S. 22; S. 244. 
18. Rep. Hinojosa Gives Doctors a Break, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 18, 2005, 
available at 2005 WLNR 8130861. 
19. Id. 
20. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n ., AMA Applauds President’s Call for 
Medical Liability Reform (2005), 
http://www.philamedsoc.org/community/Resources/phl%20med%2002_
05.pdf. 
21. Senate Passes Medical Malpractice Insurance Legislation, U.S. STATE 
NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9871447. 
22. Emergency Malpractice Liability Insurance Commission Act, H.R. 446, 
108th Cong. § 3 (2003). 
23. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n., AMA: Together We Can Fix Oregon’s 
Medical Liability Crisis (2005) (on file with the author). 
24. Id. 
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legislation is now considered largely ineffective, but at the time, it 
quelled most concerns about increasing rates.25 
Compare the claims of forty years ago to those made in recent 
years. The similarities are striking. A group of Long Island physicians 
threatened “to treat only emergency patients” unless they received 
“reasonably priced” malpractice coverage.26 Anesthesiologists in 
California and Ohio declared the same.27 New York physicians claimed 
that high premiums were either forcing them to leave the state or 
retire early.28 Doctors were not only moving from “heavily populated 
cities such as New York and Los Angeles to rural areas,” but also 
leaving the country to practice abroad.29 They were fleeing “to other 
states where there are fewer malpractice suits, smaller judgments and 
thus more reasonable insurance rates.”30 
The same panic existed then as it does now. But despite the 
ineffective legislation, the increase in rates abated as they are likely to 
again. Some physicians actually acknowledge this, noting that 
premiums have not increased without pause.31 They point to three 
periods of particularly high premiums—1970 to 1975; 1980 to 1990; 
and 1996 to the present—yet many physicians now claim that 
premiums are now at a breaking point.32 Some data, as will later be 
explained, actually suggest that once adjusted for inflation, medical 
malpractice premiums actually decreased between 1986 and 2000.33 
When Palmisano addressed the U.S. House of Representatives in 
2003, he did so in support of the Help Efficient Accessible Low-Cost 
Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act.34 This bill, like many before and 
after it, suggested reforms to make malpractice insurance more 
affordable for physicians.35 “Our healthcare system is facing a crisis,” 
Palmisano said, “when community health centers have to reduce their 
 
25. Frank A. Sloan, Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the 
1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEATH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 629 
(1985). 
26. Malpractice: The State Steps In, TIME, May 5, 1975, at 82. 
27. Id. 
28. Malpractice Mess, TIME, June 9, 1975, at 18. 
29. Malpractice: MDs Revolt, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58. 
30. Id. 
31. Sloan, supra note 25. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Hearings, supra note 1, at 76. 
35. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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services or close their doors because of liability insurance concerns.”36 
Yet, those concerns are not well founded. So why do they exist? 
Those who in recent years claimed that there is an ongoing crisis 
base that claim on anecdotes, unsupported assertions, and flawed 
data.37 Palmisano and others flouting evidence of rising premium 
costs, cite the Medical Liability Monitor Reporter (MLMR).38 For the 
last decade, nearly all data in scholarly articles and reports by 
government agencies were based on data from the MLMR, which sells 
data on malpractice insurance pricing trends.39 It obtains premium 
data from various insurance company rate sheets and, based on these 
rate sheets, reports average premium increases and decreases and 
average rates.40 It generates numbers that sound precise and make for 
compelling sources in newspaper or reports.  
For example, when the Associated Press detailed Florida’s 
“particularly difficult medical malpractice climate” in 2007, it cited 
MLMR data.41 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette did as well when 
reporting about, “malpractice fees driving away young doctors” in 
2005.42 That same year, the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle 
compared the plight of its physicians with those in New Jersey and 
Virginia, many of whom “stopped seeing patients to protest too-costly 
medical malpractice insurance.”43 It too cited MLMR data,44 as do 
many other newspaper articles and trade publications.45 Many 
 
36. Hearings, supra note 1, at 2. 
37. Marc A. Rodwin, et al., Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income: 
Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH 
AFF. 750, 757 (2006). 
38. Id. at 750. 
39. MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR REPORTER 27 (Aug. 2002) (on file with the 
author); see also MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR REPORTER 28 (Oct. 2003) 
(on file with the author). 
40. Medical Liability Monitor, http://www.medicalliabilitymonitor.com 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
41. LMS and Best Practices Medical Partners Enter Agreement for CALM 
Shoulder Screen Risk Management Tool, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 21, 2007), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lms-and-best-practices-
medical-partners-enter-agreement-for-calm-shoulder-screen-risk-
management-tool-58318962.html. 
42. See generally, Jacqueline Shoyeb, Study: Pa. Malpractice Fees Driving 
Away Young Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 18, 2005, at 
A1, available at 2005 WLNR 11251412. 
43. Joy Davia, Malpractice Insurance Soars, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & 
CHRONICLE, Feb. 25, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 17961223. 
44. Id. 
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scholarly articles on medical malpractice and government reports also 
cite MLMR data.46 
Even the AMA, despite having its own contradicting evidence, 
cites MLMR studies and uses them in support of its proposed 
restructuring of medical malpractice law.47 Indeed, the AMA has used 
data from the MLMR to support its position on medical liability 
insurance premiums. As recently as 2008, for example, the AMA 
proclaimed that “tort reforms work,” touting a then-recent analysis of 
medical liability and 2007 MLMR data.48 “This tells the story again: 
Tort reform works, and this just reaffirms it for the umpteenth time,” 
said AMA Immediate Past President William G. Plested, III, in 
American Medical News, an AMA publication.49 “In this day and age 
of evidence-based medicine, we ought to have evidence-based tort 
reform.”50  
Compelled by concerns of physicians across the country and 
Congressional requests for a report, the U.S. General Accounting 
Office (GAO) investigated rising malpractice premium rates and 
 
45. See generally, Brandon Stahl, High-risk Health Providers Stay in 
Business Thanks to State Insurance, STAR TRIBUNE, May 5, 2013, 
http://www.startribune.com/local/206125891.html; Darshak Sanghavi, 
Medical Malpractice: Why is it so Hard for Doctors to Apologize?, 
BOST. GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2013, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2013/01/27/medical-
malpractice-why-hard-for-doctors-
apologize/c65KIUZraXekMZ8SHlMsQM/story.html; Christopher 
Flavelle, Op-Ed, Pay Doctors Less, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 
14, 2012, http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2012/12/14/Pay-doctors-less/stories/201212140254; Katharine Q. 
Seelye & Andrew Keh, Parent’s Right, or Professional’s Privacy?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A14. 
46. See, e.g., Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Liability and Health Care 
Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 469 (2011); Aaron E. Carroll et al., 
The Impact of Defense Expenses in Medical Malpractice Claims, 40 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 134, 135 (2012); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes & Rene Reyes, 
The Effects of Malpractice Liability on Obstetrics and Gynecology: 
Taking the Measure of a Crisis, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 315, 321 (2012). 
47. See, e.g., Amy Sorrel, AMA Analysis Reaffirms: Tort Reforms Work, 
AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2008/03/03/prsa0303.htm. 
48. Id. 
49. See 2002 Rate Survey Finds Malpractice Premiums Are Soaring, MED. 
LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct. 2002, at I-IV (on file with the author); AMA 
Analysis Reaffirms: Tort Reform Works, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 3, 
2008), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2008/03/03/prsa0303.htm. 
50. AM. MED. NEWS, supra note 49.  
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possible causes in 2003.51 Rather than obtain its own data, or review 
multiple sources of existing data, however, the GAO relied on the 
MLMR data and presumed that it showed a crisis.52 The GAO 
reported that due to “large increases in medical malpractice insurance 
premium rates . . . physicians will no longer be able to afford 
malpractice insurance and will be forced to curtail or discontinue 
providing certain services.”53 
But the MLMR data is not reliable. Industry insiders do not put 
much stock in its data, says Stephen Langlois director of 
underwriting-actuarial services at the ProMutual Group.54 And for 
good reason. MLMR data averages the rates paid by physicians as if 
they all purchase the same number of policies from the same insurer. 
This skews the data. For example, if MLMR surveys three insurers in 
one market and averages their rates, each rate will count for one-third 
of the average. But one firm might insure more than half of the 
physicians surveyed, a second, only 30 percent, and the third only 10 
percent. The MLMR average does not reflect those differences.  
Another problem is that the MLMR does not distinguish between 
rates for different practice specialties or for different kinds of 
insurance policies. That might be acceptable if all physicians paid 
more or less the same premium. But in fact, insurance rates vary 
based on practice specialty, and the kind of policy coverage that 
physicians purchase. As we will see later, most insurers distinguish 
between about seven types of policies based on their duration. 
Insurance rates also vary depending on the level of liability protection 
that physicians purchase. Averages across all policies do not reflect 
those differences. In addition, the MLMR reports on insurance rates 
that firms file with state regulators, not the actual amount that 
physicians pay for insurance. These rates act more like a sticker price 
for a car rather than the negotiated and paid amount.  
States regulate insurance rates so insurers cannot raise those rates 
without state authorization. As a result, insurers seek approval for 
high rates to protect their ability to charge that much, but in practice 
they discount those policies based on market competition. High rates 
allow insurers the flexibility to vary charges based on changing 
conditions without having to wait until the next period for rate 
 
51. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-702, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO 
INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
52. Id. at 9. 
53. Id. 
54. Interview with Stephen Langlois, Director of Underwriting-Actuarial 
Services, ProMutual Group (2005). 
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increases or without having to take the risk that regulators will not 
approve future rate increases. 
Insurers also have a competitive advantage by not revealing to 
their competitors the actual amounts that they charge customers. 
Without that information, competitors do not know how much they 
can raise prices without the risk of losing customers. They are also 
unaware of the dollar amount by which they need to reduce their 
prices in order to attract customers from competing insurers.  
Differences between regulated rates and discounted premiums also 
make it more difficult for a firm to know the reason that a competitor 
offers a physician a lower premium than it otherwise would. The 
firm’s competitor might have offered a lower premium because it 
believed the physician had a lower risk of loss than the firm’s own 
evaluation or the competitor might simply be willing to assume the 
physician’s risk of loss for a lower fee than the firm would. In fact, 
people working in the medical malpractice insurance industry report 
that since 1990, most of them use manual rates as a baseline and vary 
the amount they charge individual physicians.55  
Yet another concern with the MLMR and most similar 
publications is that they usually report the percentage change in 
rates, not the actual dollar amount. That can make changes appear 
much greater than they actually are when premiums are low. For 
example, if insurance rates are $10,000, raising premiums by $2,000 to 
$12,000 would be a 20 percent increase. However, a $2,000 increase in 
a physician’s premiums does not have a major impact on her practice 
viability if the physician’s gross practice revenue is $500,000 and her 
total practice expenses are about half of revenue, or $250,000. If other 
practice expenses do not change, the physician’s net income would fall 
from $250,000 to $248,000. Taking all this into account, it is not 
surprising that in recent years some scholars have criticized the 
reliability of the MLMR data for tracking premium costs.56 
II. Making Sense of Changes in Malpractice Premiums 
To understand the effect of changes in malpractice insurance 
premiums on a physician’s practice requires a comparison of those 
 
55. Id. 
56. See, e.g., Kathryn Zeiler et al, Physicians’ Insurance Limits And 
Malpractice Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003, 
36 J. LEGAL STUD. s9, s37 (2007). (“[E]mpirical studies that fail to 
address policy size may generate findings that are suspect. For example, 
the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), a widely used source of data, 
provides pricing information for $1 million primary policies. If many or 
most doctors carry policies with different limits, MLM-based studies 
may mischaracterize trends in insurance pricing.”). 
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premiums to total practice expenses and revenue. First, premiums 
paid should be compared to other practice expenses. These expenses 
include office rent or mortgage payments, medical equipment and 
supplies, non-physicians’ salaries, office utilities, office supplies, and 
other overhead expenses. That information is necessary to show the 
relation between premiums, other practice expenses, and total practice 
expenses.  
Second, total practice expenses should be compared to gross 
practice revenue. This information shows the relationship between 
practice expenses and net practice income. Net practice income equals 
gross practice revenue minus total practice expenses before payment 
of taxes. Together, this information shows the relative importance of 
premiums to other practice expenses.  
Even if premiums are escalating, they may not cause the financial 
woes that are so often claimed. By considering total practice expenses, 
it appears that insurance rates are not the lone culprit—if one at all—
for raising costs of medical practice. A 2011 report by the Medical 
Group Management Association, for example, found that general 
operating expenses rose nearly 53 percent in the last decade.57 Partly 
responsible for that increase were support staff expenditures (4.8 
percent) and supply costs (7.4 percent).58 
It is also important to distinguish between short term premium 
increases or declines and long term trends. Claims such as the ones 
made by proponents of tort reform in the beginning of this article give 
the impression that rates continue to increase every year and never 
decrease. This is not the case. Studies show that they rise and fall in 
predictable cycles, just as premiums do for other insurance.59  
“Insurance markets cycle through periods of low prices and ample 
supply (called soft markets) and periods of high prices and scarce 
supply (called hard markets).”60 During soft markets, there are 
relatively low claim costs and insurers are more able to lower prices 
and attract more business.61 A soft market existed prior to the 1970s, 
 
57. John Commins, MGMA: Docs Trim Practice Expenses, But Operating 
Costs Soar, HEALTHLEADERS MEDIA (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/LED-271265/MGMA-
Docs-Trim-Practice-Expenses-But-Operating-Costs-Soar#%23.  
58. Id.  
59. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 409 (2005); see generally Kurt Karl et al., 
Capital Markets and Insurance Cycles, 4 J. RISK FINANCE 40, 40 (2003). 
60. MICHELLE M. MELLO, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 12 
(2006). 
61. Id. 
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before malpractice claims increased, costs of insuring physicians for 
liability rose, insurers raised premiums and some insurers dropped out 
of the market.62 When a change in the market like this occurs, 
however, it typically stabilizes in a few years.63 Hard markets 
ultimately soften again, providing a more competitive insurance 
market and driving insurance rates back down. 
The cycle reflects a forecasting error; that is, the difference 
between what insurers thought their losses would be over a short 
period of time and what their losses actually were.64 Unlike other 
insurance markets, the consequences of a forecasting error can be 
severe because claims are often not filed until two to three years after 
the alleged malpractice occurs.65 Insurer forecasts consider not only 
losses from existing claims, but potential losses from claims that will 
be filed in the future.66 
Baker examined one such cycle that occurred between 1980 and 
2002.67 By plotting the difference in what insurers predicted their 
losses to be and what they actually were, a trend emerges that 
mirrors the rise and fall of premium rates.68  
In 1980, medical malpractice insurers experienced losses higher 
than they anticipated, leading to a drop in profits.69 For the next six 
years, a hard market continued with declining profits causing insurers 
to raise premiums to compensate for the loss in revenue.70 Then the 
market turned.71 In 1986, predicted losses exceeded actual losses so 
insurers found themselves with more money in their reserves and a 
greater profit.72 Insurance premiums began to decrease in price 
because insurers could now afford more competitive policies.73 This 
soft market continued until 1996, when actual losses began to exceed 
 
62. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 2 HEALTH LAW 349 (2d ed., 1995). 
63. See Mello, supra note 60, at 12. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Baker, supra note 59, at 53. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. See id. at 57. 
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predicted losses again and profits suffered.74 With profits down, 
insurance rates again began to rise.75  
Other factors that affect the underwriting cycle are fluctuations in 
interest rates and the performance of the stock market. The insurance 
industry generates income by charging premiums and by investing the 
money brought in from premiums. These two main sources of 
revenue—premiums and the investment of premiums—allow the 
insurance industry to shift dependency between revenue streams. In 
periods of high interest rates, it is possible for an insurance company 
to rely more heavily on investment income. This exacerbates the 
underwriting cycle as the increased investment income derived from 
high interest rates further enables an insurance company to write 
policies below fair market value. A report by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (GAO) on medical malpractice premiums found 
that a drop in investment income of 1 percent requires a 4 percent 
increase in the premium charged to make up for the difference.76 
The performance of the stock market affects insurance investment 
earnings as well. Industry experts estimate that 15 percent of 
insurance company investments are in the stock market.77 When the 
stock market is performing well, as it did during the late 1990s, 
increased income from stock market investments further enables an 
insurance company to write policies below fair market value. When 
investment income drops, this exacerbates an upswing in the 
underwriting cycle, as rates on premiums must increase, not only to 
compensate for past policies written below fair market value, but also 
to make up for the reduced income from poor investment 
performance. This occurred in the mid-1980s when malpractice 
premiums increased dramatically after historically high interest rates 
declined and the insurance market then experienced an upswing in the 
underwriting cycle.78 Insurance companies were forced to increase 
premiums in order to offset both the reduction in revenue from 
 
74. Id. 
75. RODWIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 755. 
76. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 27. 
77. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives 
Hearing on “Pennsylvania Medical Liability Insurance Crisis” 
(statement of James Hurley, ACAS, MAAA Chairperson), available at 
http://www.actuary.org/files/medmal_10feb03.4.pdf/medmal_10feb03.
4.pdf. 
78. David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An 
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1495, 1526 (1988); John Conyers, Jr., The Health Act – A Bad 
Prescription for Consumers, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 193 (2003). 
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investment income and to compensate for the low premiums that had 
been charged in the late 1970s and early 1980s.79  
The cycles that these rates follow directly rebuke the claims of 
skyrocketing premiums. Ironically, there is data that supports all of 
this in a study conducted by one of the main parties perpetuating the 
medical malpractice myth: the American Medical Association. 
 
III. The AMA National and Regional Surveys 
Despite media reports on malpractice insurance relying on 
anecdotes or the MLMR, there is a source of comprehensive, detailed, 
and reliable data on the amounts that physicians paid for malpractice 
insurance.80 Starting in 1970 and continuing annually through 2000, 
the AMA surveyed self-employed U.S. physicians on many aspects of 
their medical practice.81  
Physicians reported malpractice premiums and other expenses as 
well as gross practice revenue. The AMA data thus reveals net 
practice income (i.e., gross practice revenue minus total practice 
expenses) as well as its relation to malpractice premiums.82 The AMA 
surveys also identify expenses and revenue by practice specialty, 
 
79. Conyers, supra note 78, at 193. 
80. The surveys were conducted by the AMA Center for Health Services 
Research (1970-1992), Socio-Economic Monitoring System (1992-1999), 
and the Patient Center Physician Survey (2000). The AMA published 
this data in numerous publications, some of which reported data for one 
year only and others reported data for more than one year. There was 
often a lag between when the data was collected and when the AMA 
published reports analyzing the data. Unless otherwise provided, all 
figures (1-10) in Part III of this article rely on AMA data from one or 
more of the follow data sources. 1970 data from AM. MED. ASS’N, 
PROFILE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (S. G. Vahovich ed., 1973); 1986 data 
from AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE STATISTICS 1978-1998 
(M. L. Gonzalez & P. Zhang eds., 1999); AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN 
MARKETPLACE STATISTICS (M. L. Gonzalez ed., 1988); 1996 data from 
AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS 1997-1998 (M. 
L. Gonzalez & P. Zhang eds., 1998); and 2000 data from AM. MED. 
ASS’N, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS 2000-2002 (J. D. 
Wassenaar & S. L. Thran eds., 2003) [hereinafter AMA SURVEYS]. 
81. These AMA surveys collected data from self-employed physicians who 
were engaged in solo or group practice, which in 2000 represented 61.5% 
of practicing physicians in the United States.  
82. The AMA surveys report a wide variety of data. It consistently reported 
national mean values for practice expenses, and practice revenue for all 
physicians and for practice specialties. It frequently reported values for 
the median, 25th percentile and 7th percentile of physicians nationally. 
Also, in reporting on regional trends the AMA reported income for all 
physicians but not for various practice specialties. 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
177 
location, physician age, physician gender, and other variables. The 
surveys include a large enough sample to yield reliable data on trends 
not only nationally, but within different practice specialties and 
within nine regions.83  
Combining data from the AMA’s annual reports reveals patterns 
over time. It can show whether the correlation between premiums and 
total practice expenses are about the same or whether they have 
changed. Since the AMA surveys ran from 1970 to 2000, they reveal 
both short-term and long-term changes as well as any premium cycles 
within that period. This is important because short-term trends may 
reveal a different picture than that of a longer term spanning 30 
years. 
When the AMA advocates for malpractice law change, it is 
ignoring its own studies. Still, researchers in government and 
universities consider the AMA practice surveys the gold standard for 
information on U.S. physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services and other agencies have relied on this data as have 
economists, health services researchers, and other scholars. For 
example, the Medicare Physician Payment Review Commission 
(PPRC), the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have all used this data to 
determine changes in practice expenses (including malpractice 
premiums) and to revise Medicare physicians’ fee-schedules.84 When 
the AMA ended its surveys in 2000, the Medicare program simply 
adjusted the data for inflation and re-estimated current practice 
expenses.85 
A. Adjusting for Inflation 
Comparing income and expenses over time can be misleading if 
not adjusted for inflation. Older readers of this article will remember 
when candy bars cost a nickel and Coke cost a dime. Comparing the 
cost of Coke and candy bars then and now does not reveal real price 
increases unless they are also compared to price increases of other 
items. Prices generally rise or fall over time for most goods and 
services. To learn whether an item costs more now than in the past in 
 
83. The AMA samples were consistently large with small standard 
deviations. For instance, in 2000, the AMA sample was based on 1,900 
completed questioners. 
84. See generally Jean M. Mitchell et al., Physicians’ Responses to Medicare 
Fee Schedule Reductions, 38 MED. CARE 1029, 1029 (2000). 
85. Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician 
Fee Schedule, 68 Fed. Reg. 63196, 63240 (Nov.7, 2003) (to be codified at 
42 C.F.R. pts. 410 & 414). 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
178 
real terms, one needs to distinguish overall price increases from those 
of the particular item. Economists and statisticians have developed 
measures that do just that. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
measures inflation for a basket of general consumer goods. One can 
compare prices from 1970 to 2000 by using the CPI and convert those 
prices from different years into inflation-adjusted prices for a single 
year. Here we will report all the AMA data adjusted by the CPI for 
the year 2005.86 
Some researchers think that it is more accurate to use a medical 
inflation index to compare malpractice premiums over time because 
studies have shown medical expenses increase much more rapidly than 
prices overall, generally twice the rate of the consumer price index.87 
However, the most accurate way to measure premium increases is to 
construct a measure that reflects both the CPI and the medical 
inflation index but more heavily weighted toward the CPI. 
Malpractice premiums are used to finance court awards or out of 
court settlements for physicians who are liable for patient injuries. 
Such liability includes paying for the injured patient’s lost income, the 
expenses that patients incur due to the injury (such as home care and 
medical equipment), and the medical costs related to the patient’s 
injury. Court judgments and awards may also compensate patients for 
pain and suffering, and they may also provide punitive damages, 
which is essentially a fine against the physician for engaging in 
reprehensible conduct rather than merely acting negligently. Some of 
these costs such as lost income are accurately reflected by the CPI. 
Settlement awards for pain and suffering are frequently a fixed 
multiple of lost income, typically three times the amount. Since the 
costs also reflect lost income, CPI also appropriately adjusts them for 
inflation. Medical expenses, and perhaps home care, however, are 
probably items best estimated by the medical inflation index rather 
than the CPI since they are items that tend to increase at the higher 
medical inflation rate. 
 
86. All dollar figures in this article are expressed in 2005 dollars. We chose 
to report 2005 dollars because one of the two principle studies from 
which data is drawn is expressed in 2005 dollars. By reporting the data 
in 2005, it is easier to compare our numbers with the other published 
studies. Readers interested in converting the values that we report in 
2005 dollars to 2015 dollars, can do so by multiplying it by 1.20. They 
can obtain a CPI index calculator online that will make the conversion 
for them for any year they choose. See CPI Inflation Calculator, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 
2015). 
87. See Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice 
Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 
230 (2005). 
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For purposes of this article, premiums are adjusted by the CPI 
rather than the medical inflation index since there is no index that 
averages CPI and medical inflation. The CPI is likely to show greater 
premium increases than the medical inflation index. Since our 
preliminary analysis of the data found that premiums increased much 
less than is usually supposed, we wanted to make sure that our 
methodological choices are not the cause of this unexpected result. 
We therefore chose the inflation measure that is more likely to 
exaggerate premium increases. 
B. Key AMA Survey Findings 
The surveys reveal four key points: (1) malpractice premiums 
were always a small portion of total practice expenses; (2) mean 
malpractice premiums grew modestly over a 30-year span; (3) during 
that time, other practice expenses increased sharply; and (4) gross 
practice revenue and net practice income increased from 1975 until 
1996, then declined modestly until 2000. 
From 1970 to 2000, mean premiums increased modestly for all 
physicians nationally. But rather than increase steadily, they rose, 
then fell, and then rose again, thus creating a cycle. Malpractice 
premiums increased from 1970 until 1986, then declined until 1996 
while remaining higher than they were in 1970. Premiums then 
increased from 1996 until 2000, but were then lower than at their 
peak in 1986. 
Throughout the 30 years, malpractice premiums always 
represented a small share of total practice expenses. Other practice 
expenses—including office rent or office building mortgage payments, 
medical equipment and medical supplies, non-physician salaries, office 
expenses and utilities88—rose steadily from 1970 to 2000 instead of 
rising and falling cyclically. These expenses increased by a much 
larger dollar amount than premiums for the whole period and they 
surged from 1986 to 2000, years during which premiums declined. As 
a result, premiums decreased as a percentage of total practice 
expenses from 1986 to 2000, due in part to declining premium rates 
and in part due to the surging increases in other practice expenses. 
Figure 1(a) shows this 30-year trend for all variables and Figure 1(b) 
shows the trend for malpractice premiums alone with a different scale 
to make clear small changes that are not visible in Figure 1(a).89 
 
88. The AMA did not report details on practice expenses for individual non-
premium expenses in most years. I reported all the details on such 
individual expenses that I found in the AMA surveys. 
89. Data drawn from the AMA surveys as reported in several AMA 
publications. The data was first analyzed for an article in Health Affairs 
where it was reported in constant 2000 dollars. In this article all this 
data has been reported in constant 2005 dollars so that it is comparable 
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Figure 1(a). Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice 
premiums, and net practice income for all self-employed physicians nationally, 
1970-2000. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant 2005 
dollars. 
 
Figure 1(b). Mean malpractice premiums for all self-employed physicians 
nationally, 1970-2000. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and expressed in 
constant 2005 dollars. 
 
 
to the second source of data that I analyze, which was originally 
reported in constant 2005 dollars. See Marc A. Rodwin et al., 
Malpractice Premiums in Massachusetts, a High-Risk State: 1975 to 
2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 835, 837 (2008). 
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The dollar change in premiums over the 30-year span increases, 
falls, and then increases again in a cycle, but it still increases in total. 
Premiums are not large, even at the high points of the premium cycle. 
Mean premiums increased $14,138 from 1970 to 2000, or $472 per 
year. Premiums declined by $122 per year from their 30-year height in 
1986 to 2000, and at that point were $1,935 lower than at their 
height.  
When the AMA and media again proclaimed a malpractice crisis 
in 2000, mean premiums were $20,900. Of course, the mean values 
represent the central tendency and individual physicians paid different 
amounts. Other statistics show variations in the amount physicians 
paid. The median premium was $12,500, meaning that half of all 
physicians paid less than $12,500 and half paid more. 
This, according to the AMA, is a crisis. Citing several sources, 
including its own survey of medical students, the AMA published a 
report in 2013 detailing what the AMA considered to be an ongoing 
liability crisis since the mid-2000s.90 At this time, according to the 
report, “45 percent of hospitals reported that the professional liability 
crisis resulted in the loss of physicians or reduced coverage in 
emergency departments.”91 The “lack of affordable liability insurance” 
forced 70 percent of OB/GYNs to make changes to their practice and 
forced 7 to 8 percent of them to stop practicing altogether.92 Further, 
the AMA claimed that medical students are so concerned with their 
potential liability that many are deciding to avoid high-risk specialties 
thus contributing to a shortage of physicians in much-needed 
practices.93 
Granted, in 2000, 25 percent of physicians paid $22,700 or more 
in premiums. But is this really a high amount to pay? So high that 
doctors are ending their practices en masse and medical students are 
avoiding certain specialties simply based on the risk associated with 
practice in that particular specialty? If physicians could cut out 
$18,400 in premium expenses, then that would certainly improve their 
bottom line and increase their income. But malpractice premiums are 
a cost of doing business, one which lawyers and other professionals 
also pay. Of course, malpractice premiums could be less; yet, they 
cannot be eliminated without removing liability for physicians that 
are negligent or failing to compensate patients when injured by 
physician negligence.  
 
90. AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM – NOW! 10 (2013). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
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The larger question is this: How do malpractice premiums affect 
both the cost of running a medical practice and the net practice 
income? To determine if premiums are a burden on practice 
profitability, consider the relationship between malpractice premiums 
and other practice expenses displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Mean malpractice premiums, non-premium expenses, and total 
practice expenses for all self-employed physicians nationally, 1970-2000 
including dollar changes for selected periods. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
Annual mean medical malpractice premiums were consistently a 
small fraction of total practice expenses. Premiums ranged from 
$6,730 to $22,803, while total practice expenses ranged from $122,319 
to $279,680. From 1970 to 2000, mean premiums increased $14,139 
while non-premium expenses increased $143,223.94  
Again, the changes were not uniform over the entire survey 
period. Malpractice premiums declined, from 1986 to 1996, while 
spending on other practice expenses increased substantially. Non-
premium expenses increased from $188,127 to $253,349, by $65,222, or 
34 percent. Office expenses increased from $50,772 to $64,489 or 27 
percent; and non-physician personnel expenses increased from $69,148 
to $4,243 or 36 percent. Spending on rent, medical equipment, and 
supplies, furniture, and utilities also increased sharply.95  
The ratio of premiums to total practice expenses are displayed in 
Figure 3. The dollar figures are for total practice expenses. 
 
94. From 1986 to 2000, total mean premiums declined by $1,935 while total 
non-premium expenses increased $70,584. 
95. The AMA distinguished between office expenses and furniture, supplies 
and utilities. The AMA included items other than these for office 
supplies. 
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Malpractice premiums as a percentage of total expenses are shown on 
the top of each bar. 
 
Figure 3. Mean medical malpractice premiums and non-premium expenses 
for self-employed physicians surveyed by the AMA, selected years 1970-2000. 
 
 
 
Note: Mean total expenses are shown in the bar graph. Data adjusted by the 
CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
Malpractice premiums represented 6 percent of total practice 
expenses in 1970 and 1996, the two years when premiums represented 
the smallest share of total practice expenses. In 1986, premiums 
comprised 11 percent of total practice expenses, the highest 
percentage in the survey. But by 2000, premiums as a percentage of 
total practice expenses dropped to 7 percent, hardly more than their 
lowest point in the survey.  
Consider now how premium increases affected net practice 
income. Figure 4 uses bar charts to compare gross practice revenue, 
malpractice premiums, non-premium expenses, and net practice 
income in 1970, 1986, 1996, and 2000. Figure 5 displays the dollar 
amount for these variables and the dollar changes for each variable in 
three periods. 
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Figure 4. Mean practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice 
premiums and net practice income for all self-employed physicians nationally, 
1970-2000. 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant 2005 
dollars. 
 
In reviewing practice expenses, keep in mind that mean net 
practice income increased from $211,535 in 1970 to $260,287 in 2000, 
representing a total increase of $48,752, or $1,625 per year over 30 
years. When premiums increased between 1970 and 1986, they had 
only a small effect on net income. While premiums increased by 
$16,073, that increase was only a fraction of the $72,538 increase for 
non-premium expenses; and despite increases in total practice 
expenses, net income increased by $22,019. When premiums declined 
$1,935 from 1986 to 2000, non-premium expenses increased by 
$70,686.  
From 1996 to 2000, physicians’ net practice income fell nationally. 
This was primarily due to decreased gross practice revenue. Revenue 
decreased $4,817 per year during that four-year period, which is 
nearly six times as great as the $829 premium increase per year 
during that same period. Also, between 1996 and 2000, non-premium 
expenses increased $1,366 per year. 
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Figure 5. Mean gross practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice 
premiums and net practice income, 1970-2000 including the dollar change for 
each variable and selected periods. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
The data on mean premiums for physicians nationally and across 
practice specialties does not support claims of a premium crisis 
around the year 2000. If there was a crisis, it appeared to be around 
1986, the peak year for premiums. But even then, premiums were a 
small part of total practice expenses. No doubt physicians felt a 
financial pinch, but it was not because of the premiums they paid. 
When compared to other expenses, premiums were not the dire 
problem as described by many physicians and politicians. 
C. A Crisis Within Selected Practice Specialties? 
Might some medical specialties face a premium crisis not reflected 
in average rates for all physicians? In theory it is possible, but the 
data do not show this to be the case. 
Specialties paying the highest premiums include obstetrics, 
neurosurgery, orthopedics, and until 1990, anesthesiology. The AMA 
reports data for all of these specialties except neurosurgery, which was 
still developing as a practice specialty when the surveys began in 1970 
and is thus not included as a practice category in the data. A review 
of the AMA data shows that the specialty with the highest premiums 
is Obstetrics/Gynecology (OB/GYN) followed by orthopedic surgery. 
The specialties with the highest premiums are most likely to 
experience a crisis, so let us look at the at the AMA data to see if 
they did.  
Figure 6 uses a line graph to display the relationship among gross 
revenue, non-premium expenses, premiums, and net practice income 
nationwide for OB/GYNs from 1970 to 2000. Figure 7 displays the 
dollar values for these variables and the dollar value of change for 
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three periods. Figure 8 shows as a bar graph the relation among gross 
practice revenue, non-premium expenses, premiums and net practice 
income in three periods. 
OB/GYNs reflect the basic trend of all physicians in terms of 
premiums paid, premium cycles, and total practice expenses. Their 
premium rates increased moderately over thirty years while non-
premium expenses increased sharply. Premiums for OB/GYNs—the 
highest of any specialty—were always a small fraction of total 
practice expenses; they were as low as 8 percent of total practice 
expenses in 1970 and as high as 20 percent in 1986. Premiums fell 
thereafter until 1996 and then increased until 2000 when they 
comprised 13 percent of total practice expenses or $44,459. From 1986 
to 2000, OB/GYN premiums decreased $7,739 or $553 per year while 
non-premium practice expenses increased $91,970 or $6,569 per year.  
Despite having the highest malpractice premiums, OB/GYN net 
mean practice income was consistently higher than mean net 
physician income. Although OB/GYN net income decreased from its 
high of $302,401 in 1996, it was $275,484 in 2000 when mean practice 
income for all physicians was $260,287. Malpractice premiums did not 
appear to create an OB/GYN crisis. 
 
Figure 6. Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice premiums 
and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally, 1970-
2000. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
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Figure 7. Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice premiums 
and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally, 1970-2000 
including the dollar change for each variable and for selected periods. 
 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
Figure 8. Mean practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice 
premiums and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally, 
1970-2000. 
 
 
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
D. A Crisis Among Physicians Paying Higher Than Mean Premiums? 
A review of data for the 75th percentile shows that premiums 
were no greater a share of total expenses for physicians within that 
top quartile than for the mean. In 2000, premiums represented either 
the same percentage of total expenses at the 75th percentile as at the 
mean or a lower percentage of total expenses. This is true both as a 
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whole nationally and specifically for OB/GYNs. In 1986 and 1996, the 
relationship among these variables was similar; median values were 
within two points of the mean for all physicians and within three 
points for OB/GYNs.  
Expressed in 2005 dollars, median premiums in 2000 were $12,476 
with the top quartile of physicians paying $22,683 or more. If these 
physicians had other practice expenses and revenue that were in the 
top quartile, their higher premiums would not have resulted in lower 
net practice income than most physicians; indeed, net practice income 
for the top quartile of physicians was at or above $340,244.  
But physicians who paid higher than mean premiums while also 
having other expenses and net revenue at the mean level would have 
had lower than mean net income. For example, consider a physician 
who, in 2000, generated median revenue and had median non-
premium practice expenses while paying premiums at the 75th 
percentile for self-employed physicians, $22,683. This physician would 
pay $10,207 more in premiums than the median of $12,476. As a 
result, this physician’s net income would decrease from the median of 
$226,829 to $216,622. Although that physician would earn less that 
many others, there still does not appear to be an excessive burden 
imposed by the premium costs. 
E. A Crisis Within Specific Regions? 
It is possible that there are regional premium crises that are not 
reflected in national data because the national data simply averages 
all regions together. Many factors affect the local cost of premiums. 
For instance, state insurance regulations can affect premiums. State 
laws, medical practice, and even culture can affect the rate of 
negligent practice, the propensity of individuals to bring suits, and 
the amount of awards. Groups advocating legislation that caps the 
amount of money patients can recover say that legislation will reduce 
malpractice practice premiums, and consequently, the size of awards. 
About half of U.S. jurisdictions have some sort of caps on malpractice 
awards, so these states may have lower premiums than states without 
caps.96  
Of those states without caps, some are currently considering 
legislation that would reduce the size of awards, and consequently, 
the price of premiums. Hawaii legislators, for example, proposed a bill 
that would limit non-economic damages in medical tort actions, 
 
96. Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends 
and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, 2004 HEALTH AFF. W4-20, W4-26 
(2004); see also Medical Liability/Medical Malpractice Laws, NAT’L 
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURE (Aug. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-
liability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx. 
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contingent on insurers capping their premium rates.97 The legislation, 
which was not enacted, would have limited all non-economic damages 
in medical tort actions to a maximum award of $500,000. Meanwhile, 
Virginia legislators have questioned whether their current cap on 
medical liability is low enough to adequately deter defensive 
practices.98  
National data does not necessarily reflect these efforts to limit 
liability, but instead provides statistics representing an average of all 
states. There is potential for those states with escalating premiums to 
overshadow the many more states with more reasonable rates or 
statutory limits on liability. Perhaps, one may argue, if not a national 
crisis, there exists a regional one. Unfortunately, AMA publications 
do not include state specific data, probably because the sample size 
was not large enough to yield reliable statistics for each state. But the 
surveys do include data for nine regions. Figure 9 displays regional 
and national mean dollars for all variables from 1986 to 2000. It also 
shows premiums as a percentage of these variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97. H.R. 2754 (Haw. 2010), available at 
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2010/Bills/HB2754_.html. 
 
98. H.R. Res. 14, 2010 Sess (Va. 2010), available at 
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+ful+HJ14. 
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Figure 9. Self-employed physicians: regional variations in mean malpractice 
premiums, total expenses, net income; premiums as a percentage of total 
expenses and new income, selected years 1986-2000. 
 
New England Middle Atlantic 
East North 
Central 
West North 
Central   National 
 $A %B $A %B $A %B $A %B   $B %B 
Medical Malpractice Premiums 
1986 19.1 - 26.5 - 23.8 - 24.3 -     
1996 17.9 - 22.1 - 21.1 - 14.3 -     
2000 14.4 - 26.3 - 21.2 - 17.2 -     
Total Expenses 
1986 168.5 11% 187.8 14% 189.4 13% 236.2 10%   211 11%
1996 211.1 8% 248.7 9% 262.8 8% 275.3 5%   270.9 6% 
2000 298.7 5% 267.3 10% 291.2 7% 223.2 8%   280.1 7% 
Net Income 
1986 206 9% 222.3 12% 251.6 9% 229.7 11%   233.5 10%
1996 242.1 6% 288 8% 285.4 7% 313.9 5%   288.3 6% 
2000 222.1 7% 229.3 11% 241.7 9% 236.4 7%   260.3 8% 
 
 South Atlantic 
East South 
Central 
West South 
Central Mountain Pacific National 
 $A %B $A %B $A %B $A %B $A %B $A %A 
Medical Malpractice Premiums 
1986 25.6 - 18 - 14.4 - 21.3 - 22.8 - 22.8  
1996 16.2 - 15.7 - 14.3 - 18.7 - 14.7 - 17.6  
2000 21.4 - 23.3 - 17.7 - 21.8 - 16.7 - 20.9  
Total Expenses 
1986 233.1 11% 236.9 8% 247.5 6% 186.3 11% 209.5 11% 211 11%
1996 325.3 5% 298.7 5% 266.9 5% 278.9 7% 247.1 6% 270.9 6% 
2000 280.9 8% 296.1 8% 269.2 7% 264.6 8% 297.3 6% 280.1 7% 
Net Income 
1986 239.4 11% 250.3 7% 249.7 6% 208.8 10% 225.7 10% 233.5 10%
1996 294.2 6% 335.9 5% 299.9 5% 295.1 6% 262.2 6% 288.3 6% 
2000 230.9 9% 258.4 9% 256.5 7% 223.8 10% 215.6 8% 260.3 8% 
 
Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index to constant 2005 dollars.  
$A: Thousand dollars; 
%B: Premiums as a percentage of the variable (total expenses, net income, or 
revenue) in the year shown in column 1. 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
191 
The nine regions reflected national trends with only slight 
variations.99 Premiums decreased between 1 and 41 percent in the 
regions from 1986 to 1996, then increased until 2000 in all regions 
except New England. Premiums in 2000 were less than 1986 levels in 
six regions and above those levels in three regions. The highest 
increases were in the East South Central region.  
In 2000, premiums were highest in the Middle Atlantic. At 
$26,300, this was $5,400 more than the national mean. But Middle 
Atlantic premiums were then less than in 1986 and represented less 
than 10 percent of total practice expenses. In 2000, physician net 
income in the Middle Atlantic region was $253,400, nearly $7,000 less 
than the national mean of $260,300. Three regions with premiums 
lower than the Middle Atlantic region, however, had lower net 
income—New England, Mountain and Pacific. 
Nationally, premiums constituted 11 percent of total practice 
expenses at their height in 1986 and 6 percent in 1996, when at their 
lowest. Premiums ranged within regions from 14 percent of expenses 
in 1986 in the Middle Atlantic to 5 percent of expenses in 2000 in 
New England. Though the data does not provide a complete picture 
of potential regional crises, the most telling statistic may be the 
following: Regional premiums as a percentage of total practice 
expenses were never more than 3 points higher than the national 
mean in any of the years surveyed. 
F. Can AMA Data Be Interpreted to Suggest a Crisis Exists? 
Premium increases since 1996 must be considered in light of 
premium decreases for the 14 preceding years prior to 2000. Rates 
were lower in 2000 than in 1986 for all physicians nationally, for 
OB/GYNs (the highest premium practice specialty) and for the 
Middle Atlantic Region (the highest premium region). 
Nonetheless, viewed impartially and uncritically, the AMA data 
can support the perception that premium increases resulted in a 
decline in physician income. The surveys show that while premiums 
increased by $3,314 from 1996 to 2000, many physicians’ income 
declined.100 These trends alone might lead casual observers to conclude 
that premium increases actually caused the income decline.  
 
99. The New England region: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Maine; the Pacific region: California, Oregon and Washington; the 
Mountain region: Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming; the Middle 
Atlantic region: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware; the 
East North Central region: Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; the West 
North Central region: Minnesota; the South Atlantic region: Florida; the 
East South Central region: Louisiana, Mississippi; and the West South 
Central region: Texas. 
100. Supra Figure 2. 
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Armed with this anecdotal evidence, the national media ran with 
that story for several years. “Dr. David Snyder is calling it quits,” 
began a 2003 article in the Pittsburgh Business Times.101 “After 
practicing in Beaver County for 12 years, the escalating malpractice 
premiums have forced the 55-year-old general surgeon to an abrupt 
stop.”102 Said Snyder, “I can’t ignore the economics of my 
situation.”103 
Despite some doctors’ difficulties, a different economic picture 
emerges when other data are examined. From 1996 until 2000, non-
premium expenses increased for physicians nationally by $5,463.104 
Furthermore, mean gross practice revenue declined for physicians 
nationally by $19,269.105 As a result, net practice income fell by 
$28,046.106 It was declining revenue combined with increasing non-
premium expenses that caused the overwhelming share of declining 
net practice income—not malpractice premiums. Increasing insurance 
rates were responsible for at most 12 percent of the decline in net 
income—in many cases, much less.  
The situation is similar, if not more dramatic, for OB/GYNs. 
From 1996 to 2000, OB/GYN mean premiums increased by $636, but 
non-premium expenses increased by $17,399.107 Increases in non-
premium expenses were more than 27 times the size as increase in 
premiums. During this period, gross practice revenue also decreased 
by $8,882. As a result, increasing malpractice premiums constituted 
less than 2.5 percent of the decline in net income.  
In the Middle Atlantic Region, from 1996 to 2000, mean 
premiums increased by $4,200 but non-premium expenses increased 
even more, by $14,400.108 Gross practice revenue also decreased by 
$34,600. Here too, decreases in gross practice revenue and increases in 
non-premium expenses accounted for the overwhelming share of 
decreased net practice income. Increased malpractice premiums 
accounted for just under 12 percent of decreased physician income.  
 
101. Maria Simbra, Disappearing Doctors – The High Cost of Rising 
Malpractice Premiums, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 27, 2003), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2003/01/27/focus4.html
?page=all. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Supra Figure 2. 
105. Supra Figure 5. 
106. Supra Figure 5. 
107. Supra Figure 7. 
108. Supra Figure 9. 
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In summary, although the AMA and many physicians might 
blame premiums for their declining income from 1996 to 2000, the 
overwhelming share of falling net practice income came through the 
combination of declining gross practice revenue and increasing non-
premium expenses.  
Why did physician revenue decline? The AMA data cannot 
answer that question. Separate studies suggest that third-party payers 
reduced physician fees and made physicians bear financial risk for the 
volume of services they supplied or recommended.109 Writing in 1992, 
Gregory Pope and John E. Schneider, economists at the Center for 
Health Economics Research in Waltham, Massachusetts, wrote, 
“Rapid physician income growth in the 1980s suggests that it would 
not impose a financial hardship, on average, for physicians to 
contribute to federal deficit reduction through lower Medicare fees.”110 
In fact, Medicare did reduce physician payment.  
Insurers appear to have reduced the volume of services that 
physicians performed by employing managed care techniques such as 
requiring authorization for elective surgery, limiting access to 
specialists and other utilization management techniques. By reducing 
the volume of services which physicians would be reimbursed, they 
reduced physician income. 
 
109. A report by the Center for Studying Health System Change reveals that 
between 1995 and 2003 physician net income from medical practice 
declined 7% after adjusting for inflation and that the major factor was 
“flat or declining fees from public and private payers.” HA T. TU & 
PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, LOSING 
GROUND: PHYSICIAN INCOME, 1995-2003 3 (2006). A study by professor 
Carol Simon, University of Illinois, and Patricia Born, an economist at 
the American Medical Association Center for Health Policy Research, 
shows that physician income declined from 1993 to 1994. They state 
that the “[d]ata . . . are generally consistent with the hypothesis that 
managed care shifted the demand for physician services toward primary 
care providers while reducing utilization, fees, or both to physicians.” 
Carol J. Simon & Patricia H. Born, Physician Earnings in a Changing 
Managed Care Environment, 15 HEALTH AFF. 124, 127 (1996). The role 
of physician risk sharing and capitation is noted in Carol J. Simon & 
David W. Emmons, Physician Earnings at Risk: An Examination of 
Capitated Contracts, 16 HEALTH AFF. 120, 120 (1997); see also Marsha 
R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care 
Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEJM 1678, 1678 (1995). 
110. Gregory C. Pope & John E. Schneider, Trends in Physician Income, 11 
HEALTH AFF. 181, 191 (1992) (finding that “physicians’ real income rose 
handsomely in the late 1980s.”) Id. at 184. The authors concluded that 
the “[p]rovision of more services and higher profit per service 
contributed roughly equally to physician income growth in the 1980s.” 
Id. at 188. The authors found that between 1982 and 1988, 42% of the 
growth of income was due to increased services and that 58% due to 
higher unit-profit margin. Id. at 188.  
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
194 
While the AMA surveys may startle many readers because they 
contradict the statements of the AMA political campaigns to cap 
malpractice premiums, other AMA reports show that the AMA 
accepts the findings of its surveys, even though it takes a different 
stance in public. For instance, a 2002 AMA report stated that 
“average premiums across all specialties and geographical regions 
declined from $15,900 in 1988 to $13,800 in 1992, and then rose to a 
new high of $16,800 in 1998.”111 However, the report continued by 
adding, “in inflation adjusted dollars, malpractice premiums declined 
30.3% between 1988 and 1998.”112  
Unfortunately, the AMA ended its surveys in 2000. What then 
can be said about premiums since then? The AMA surveys reveal 
cyclical premium increases and decreases since 1970, rather than 
steady increases. There is no reason to believe that the short-term 
premium increases that began in 1996 will not later decline or that 
they will affect the long-term cyclic trends previously identified. 
Furthermore, the AMA surveys are in line with other reliable 
data. Information published by the federal government to explain the 
basis of its Medicare physician fee-schedule indicates that, despite 
increases in malpractice premiums after 2000, premiums as of mid-
year 2003 remained a small fraction of total practice expenses. 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which 
administers Medicare, adjusts physician payment periodically based 
on changes in practice costs and other variables. At least in this 
respect, claims of burdensome premium payments are less credible 
when CMS explicitly adjusts fees to account for changes in the cost of 
medical malpractice insurance. In addition, the amounts that 
Medicare pays physicians are adjusted regionally to account for 
differences in malpractice premiums and other costs.  
The basis for CMS’s conclusions on malpractice premiums, 
additional practice costs, and other aspects of its proposed fee 
schedule are published in the Federal Register. Affected parties can 
comment on the proposed fee schedule. Because the fee schedule is 
important for Medicare payments and because private insurers also 
use the fee schedule as a model, professional medical groups submit 
detailed comments. CMS must take account of comments on its 
proposed fee schedule in promulgating a final Medicare fee schedule. 
CMS publishes responses to comments that explain the basis for its 
 
111. AMERICAN MED. ASSOC., AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICES, CMS 
REPORT 12: LIABILITY INSURANCE PREMIUMS (2002) (noting the number 
in this AMA document are as reported and have not been converted in 
2005 dollars) (on file with the author). 
112. Id. (emphasis added). 
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final decision. If CMS does not adequately respond to any criticism 
via these comments, affected parties can sue the agency in federal 
court. If a court finds that the CMS fee schedule is arbitrary and 
capricious or against the weight of evidence, the court can overturn 
the fee-schedule.  
In the fall of 2003, CMS revised the weights that it uses to 
determine the cost of medical practice for the Medicare fee-schedule 
to take effect in January 2004. CMS revised the fee schedule to take 
account of data on increased medical malpractice premiums through 
mid-year 2003.113 It also projected additional premium increases into 
2004.114  
In proposing another revision of physician fees in July 2007 to 
take effect the following year, CMS has used the same weights for 
malpractice premiums.115 Using the same AMA data used in this 
article, and numerous other sources, CMS found that premiums had 
increased from 3.152 percent of gross practice revenue in 1996 to 
3.865 percent of gross practice revenue in 2004.116 This represented 
nearly a 17 percent increase in the weight assigned to malpractice 
premiums as a factor in physician practice costs. The CMS findings 
regarding the relationship between malpractice premiums and gross 
practice revenue are displayed in the pie-chart below in Figure 10(a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113. Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician 
Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,196, 63,213 (Nov. 
7, 2003). 
114. Id. 
115. See Medicare Program: Proposed Revisions, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,122 (July 
12, 2007) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 409, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415, 
418, 423, 424, 482, 484, 485 and 491). 
116. Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the 
Physician Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,196, 
63,240 (Nov. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410 and 414). 
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Figure 10(a). Allocation of gross practice revenue for physicians nationally, 
2004, as determined by Medicare.117 
 
 
The CMS findings on malpractice premiums were stated as a 
percentage of gross practice revenue. Total practice costs were 47 
percent of gross revenue. Therefore, CMS found that malpractice 
premiums accounted for about 8 percent of total practice costs as is 
indicated by the pie-chart below in Figure 10(b).  
 
Figure 10(b). Malpractice premiums as a percentage of total practice 
expenses for physicians nationally, 2004.118 
 
 
 
 
117. Medicare Program, 68 Fed. Reg. at 63,240. Chart compiled by the 
authors. 
118. Id. 
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Finally, claims that malpractice premiums make it difficult for 
physicians to have a viable medical practice need to be evaluated in 
terms of what is known about physician income in relation to the 
earnings of other workers in the United States. Physicians remain 
among the highest-paid professional groups in the country. Mean 
physician net income in 2003 was between the ninety-fifth and ninety-
ninth percentiles for all Americans.119 As Figure 11 shows, in 2000, 
physicians had dramatically higher earnings than not only most 
workers but also most professionals, people with doctorates or masters 
degrees.120  
 
Figure 11. Mean physician income relative to mean income for all full-time 
year round workers and people with professional degrees, doctorates, and 
master’s degrees in 2000. 
 
 Full Time Workers Physicians
Professional 
Degrees 
Ph.D. 
Master’s 
Degrees 
All 
Physicians 
 $260,287    
Men $59,884  $135,501 $104,039 $88,123 
Women $39,701  $69,126 $60,523 $51,705 
 
Sources: Full Time Worker Income from U.S. Census Bureau, Table P-37 
Full-Time Year-Round All Workers by Mean Income and Sex: 1955-2013;121 
Physician income from AMA Surveys; Professional Degree, Doctorate, and 
Master’s Degree income from U.S. Census Bureau, Table P-18 Educational 
Attainment—People 25 years Old and Over by Mean Income and Sex: 1991-
2013.  
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
 
119. See David Cay Johnston, Richest Are Leaving Even the Rich far 
Behind, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/national/class/HYPER-
FINAL.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (citing chart titled “The 
Wealthiest Benefit More from Tax Cuts”). 
120. AMA data on physicians do not provide separate income data for 
women and men physicians. The Census data on earnings used above 
provide separate income data for women and men and no average for all 
individuals in these categories. 
121. Figures for all other occupations are derived from Historical Income 
Tables: People, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/people/ (last 
updated Sept. 16, 2014). 
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To paraphrase Mark Twain’s well-known response to finding his 
obituary prematurely published in a newspaper: The reported recent 
demise of medical practice as a result of rising malpractice premiums 
has been greatly exaggerated.  
IV.  Do Some States Have a Premium Crisis? 
Some states have enacted legislation capping the amount of 
damage awards. Consequently, premiums in these states might be 
lower than those without caps. Thus despite offering compelling 
evidence against claims of a premium crisis on a national and regional 
basis, the AMA surveys may not be able to reveal a crisis for 
particular states if these crises occur in states without caps on awards. 
Several states place caps on the total award; however, most states 
that do cap awards typically limit payment for pain and suffering or 
punitive damages, rather than for loss of income or out-of-pocket 
expenses. As of October 2005, eleven states had laws capping damage 
awards for non-economic damages at $250,000; ten states had 
legislation that capped awards at between $250,001 and $499,999; 
thirteen states had legislation limiting non-economic damages at 
$500,000 or higher; and eighteen jurisdictions did not have any limits 
on damage awards.122 
Some studies suggest, however, that the difference in premiums 
between states with award caps and those without them is slight. In 
2003, the Government Accountability Office reviewed studies on the 
effect of statutory caps on premiums. The GAO concluded that there 
is disagreement as to whether caps on damages lead to lower 
premiums and that “a lack of comprehensive data on losses at the 
 
122. States that capped damage awards for non-economic damages: At 
$250,000 (AL, AR, CA, CO, ID, IN, KS, ME, MT, NC, TX); caps 
between $250,001 and $499,999 (AK, GA, HI, MI, MO, NV, NJ, OK, 
SC, UT); caps at $500,000 or higher (FL, IL, LA, MD, MA, MS, NE, 
NM, ND, OH, SD, VA, WV); jurisdictions without caps (AL, AZ, CT, 
DE, IA, KY, MN, NH, NY, OR, PA, RI, TN, VT, WA, WI, WY and 
Washington, D.C.). See Liability: Limits on Damage Awards, AM. 
ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS (Oct. 2005), available at 
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/legal/liability/
ES-LiabilityDamage-1005.pdf. See also Medical Liability/Medical 
Malpractice Laws, NAT’L CONF. ON ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medical-
liability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 15, 2011). 
Fourteen jurisdictions do not have a damage award limit or cap, thirty-
eight jurisdictions have a limit or cap. Connecticut and Minnesota allow 
for a court to review of the damage awarded, but does not specify a 
specific limit or cap. 
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insurance company level makes measuring the precise impact of [state 
caps] impossible.”123  
In 2004, Kenneth Thorpe studied how award caps affect 
premiums. He estimated that in the twenty-five states with caps on 
damage awards, “premium[s] per physician . . . were associated with a 
12 percent reduction in premiums” compared to non-cap states.124 In 
other words, averaging premiums in states with caps and premiums in 
states without caps for yielded a 12 percent difference in premiums 
among the two groups of states. Even if we accept Thorpe’s 
conclusion and assume that premiums are 6 percent higher in states 
with caps than the AMA data indicate (because it averages between 
states with and without caps), premiums in these states would still be 
a very small percentage of total practice expenses. They simply would 
not be large enough to substantially affect net practice income. Using 
Thorpe’s 12 percent finding, for example, premiums still constituted 
only 2 percent of total practice expenses in 2000. If the reported mean 
dollar values for premiums for physicians nationally are increased by 6 
percent with other expenses and revenue remaining constant, 
premiums would be 8 percent of total expenses, net income reduced 
by $1,252.  
The Thorpe study, however, averaged premiums across twenty-
five states with caps on awards. This may hide premium differences 
among the individual states averaged, still allowing for the possibility 
of state-specific crises.  
A recent study led by David Hyman on the effect of caps on non-
economic damages in Texas found that the effect of caps is less than 
supposed because damage awards often are reduced to the lower 
limits of individual liability insurance coverage.125 Expressed in 1988 
dollars, the cap in Texas reduced the mean payout in cases with jury 
verdicts by $184,000, from $696,000 to $512,000.126 Predicted payouts 
in settled cases declined by $56,000, from $313,000 to $257,000.127  
Nonetheless, the only way to be certain that no state specific 
premium crises exist is to obtain reliable data from every state. 
Although no such data exists, there is a worthy alternative: Reliable 
data from a state that by all accounts should have a premium crisis if 
such a crisis exists. 
 
123. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 42. 
124. Thorpe, supra note 96, at W 4-26-27. 
125. David A. Hyman, et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in 
Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence From Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
356, 400 (2009). 
126. Id.  
127. Id.  
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A. Massachusetts as a Test Case 
Based on all available information, if there are states with a 
premium crisis, Massachusetts should be among them. The AMA 
itself declared Massachusetts a “crisis state.”128 Why? Because 
Massachusetts has a soft $500,000 settlement cap that allows broad 
exceptions and that is “woefully inadequate,” according to the 
Massachusetts Medical Society, another organization claiming a 
national premium crisis.129  
“The AMA is disheartened that the medical liability environment 
in Massachusetts has deteriorated to the point where physicians are 
restricting services, and patients are losing access to care,” said the 
AMA’s Palmisano in 2004.130 The situation outside of Boston is 
particularly worrisome.”131 Added Alan Woodward, then president of 
the Massachusetts Medical Society: “Our patients have world-class 
physicians and health care institutions, but this crisis has been 
steadily eroding the quality of our health care system for many 
years.”132 
Stoking the panic are data from the National Practitioner Data 
Bank (NPDB). These data indicate that, from 2000 to 2005, 
Massachusetts should have had higher premiums than most states 
because of its high malpractice settlement payments. Malpractice 
premiums reflect the size of malpractice awards and their frequency. 
The Massachusetts median settlement payment of $187,000 ranked 
fourth, and its mean settlement payment of $329,000 ranked sixth for 
all jurisdictions nationally.133 At 4.34 payments per 100,000 people, 
the state is ranked 24th in the frequency of awards nationally, but 
 
128. MASS. MED. SOC., ADDING VALUE, MAKING A DIFFERENCE – 2004 
ANNUAL REPORT 6-7 (2004) http://www.massmed.org/about/mms-2004-
annual-report-(pdf). 
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2000); Mass. Med. Soc’y, Background: 
Massachusetts Medical Liability Crisis (June 14, 2004) (on file with the 
author). 
130. Massachusetts Becomes 20th State in a Medical Liability Crisis, PR 
NEWSWIRE (June 14, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/massachusetts-becomes-20th-state-in-a-medical-liability-crisis-
74960777.html. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., 
NATIONAL PRACTIONER DATA BANK – 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2005) 
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2005NPDBAnnualReport.
pdf. 
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had less than one fewer payment per 100,000 than the ninth highest 
state.134  
Only Washington D.C. and Connecticut had both higher mean 
payment sizes and frequency. Since Massachusetts malpractice 
payments were among the highest nationally, its premiums should 
also be high compared to other states. Not the case. In Massachusetts, 
mean premiums were lower in 2005 than in 1990 for nearly all 
physicians. 
B. The Massachusetts Study Data 
Our study of Massachusetts premiums (the Massachusetts Study) 
used data from the state regulated mutual insurer, the Medical 
Professional Mutual Insurance Company, known as ProMutual Group 
(PMG), which since 1975, has been the state’s main medical 
malpractice insurer.135 Its insurance rates reflect prices available to 
most physicians. 
In 1975, as a result of the exit of commercial malpractice insurers 
from Massachusetts, the legislature created the Massachusetts 
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (MMJUA). The 
legislature converted it into the Massachusetts Medical Professional 
Insurance Association in 1993 and then in 1995 to ProMutual. Around 
the time of the formation of the MMJUA, Harvard affiliated hospitals 
created the Controlled Risk Insurance Company (CRICO) for its 
affiliated physicians.  
Since their creation in the late 1970s, the MMJUA/ProMutual 
and CRICO controlled about 90 percent of the physicians’ liability 
insurance market, each covering about half that market.136 In 2005, 
A.M. Best (a U.S.-based rating agency focused on the insurance 
industry) reported that the ProMutual Group covered 77 percent of 
regulated professional liability insurance, which includes other medical 
professionals and health care institutions. Those physicians that did 
not purchase insurance from the ProMutual Group or CRICO 
purchased insurance from other state regulated insurers or from 
unregulated risk-retention groups and offshore insurers. 
 
134. Id. Calculations based on National Practitioner Data Bank. Data 
adjusted by state population from U.S. Census data for 2001-2004. 
135. The author had restricted access to the raw data used to compile the 
figures in this section. As a result of this restriction, the Editor was 
unable to review the raw data before going to print. 
136. See Johnston, surpa note 119 (citing the chart “The Wealthiest Benefit 
More from Recent Tax Cuts”). 
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C. How Insurers Set Premiums 
To understand changes in the cost of professional liability 
insurance, it helps to consider the various kinds of liability insurance 
available. Insurers sell several types of policies, each priced differently. 
Policies vary based on the time period covered and the dollar amount 
of liability coverage. Insurers set premiums based on three key 
variables: (1) risk of loss (which can vary with practice specialty and 
other factors), (2) the dollar amount of protection, and (3) the time 
period covered.137  
Insurers calculate each practice specialty’s risk of loss and assign 
it to a premium rate group.138 Once insurers assign each practice 
specialty to a rate group, they can refine their risk assessment based 
on many other factors including the physician’s claims history, length 
of time in medical practice, their work setting, and organizational 
affiliation.139  
Policies specify a maximum amount that can be reimbursed both 
per claim and yearly for all claims. Massachusetts initially required 
that physicians purchase at least $100,000 of loss coverage per claim 
with coverage capped at a $300,000 yearly loss.140 Starting in 1987, 
the Massachusetts Board of Registration required physicians to 
purchase up to $100,000 coverage per claim, capped at a $300,000 
yearly loss.141 In 2006, $1/$3 million coverage was the most frequently 
purchased amount of liability protection, and $2/$6 million coverage 
was the second most frequent level of protection purchased.142  
Patients often do not file claims in the same year that the 
incident occurred, though statutes of limitation restrict the time that 
patients have to file. Professional liability insurance policies cover 
either periods when alleged negligence occurs, regardless of when 
 
137. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 12, at 5-15, 34-36. 
138. ProMutual Group had eight rate groups in 1975. As it obtained more 
information, PMG refined its risk analysis. It used fifteen rate groups by 
1990 and nineteen by 2005. 
139. In 1990, PMG began to selectively discount rates within practice-
specialty rate groups based on these and other factors. In 2000, PMG 
increased the frequency and size of its discounts and occasionally 
imposed surcharges on physicians it deemed high-risks. 
140. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07 (16) (1987). 
141. 243 C.M.R. §2.07(16). 
142. States vary on whether they require physicians to purchase liability 
insurance, and if so, what amount. However, even if states do not 
mandate that physicians must purchase a minimum dollar amount of 
liability insurance, often hospitals require that physicians do as a 
condition for granting physicians privileges to practice in the hospital. 
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claims are filed (occurrence policies), or periods during which patients 
file negligence claims (claims-made policies).  
Physicians renewing a claims-made policy are covered from the 
first year that they owned the policy. Premiums are higher for claims-
made policies in the second, third, and fourth years because the 
policies cover a longer time. Insurers also sell mature claims-made 
policies that cover five or more years of past practice.  
Occurrence policies are more expensive than first through fourth 
year claims-made policies and less than mature claims-made policies. 
The cost of insurance through claims-made and occurrence policies 
generally converge over time because physicians who do not renew a 
claims-made policy need to purchase “tail insurance” for claims filed 
later. 
D. Grouping Physicians into Five Practice Tiers 
The Massachusetts study focused on $1/$3 million and $2/$6 
million occurrence policies because together, these two types 
accounted for 81.2 percent of the policies in 2005. Occurrence policies 
are the second most expensive type of policy. Mature claims-made 
policies, which are slightly more expensive than occurrence policies, 
comprised 10.7 percent of all policies. 
In 2005, 54.6 percent of PMG’s policies were for $1/$3 million 
occurrence and 26.6 percent were for $2/$6 million occurrence. Nearly 
66 percent of PMG’s occurrence policies were for $1/$3 million 
coverage, 30.3 percent were for $2/$6 million; only 1.6 percent 
provided greater coverage. In 2005, 67.4 percent of all PMG’s policies 
were for $1/$3 million coverage and 30.3 percent were for $2/$6 
million coverage.  
While the raw data provided information on each rate group, 
policy type, and dollar amount of coverage, reviewing the information 
for nineteen rate groups, six policy durations, and several levels of 
dollar coverage is much too cumbersome. Further, the data showed 
only small differences in premiums among the rate groups. To clarify 
the main trends, the Massachusetts study divided the nineteen rate 
groups into five tiers. The 2005 practice specialties in each tier and 
percentage of physicians in each tier are listed below, starting with 
the most expensive tier and descending to the least expensive tier: 
Tier 1. Four percent of physicians: OB/GYN, neurological 
surgery, and orthopedists performing spinal surgery. 
Tier 2. Four percent of physicians: Major vascular, 
cardiovascular, head and neck, traumatic, and orthopedic 
(except spinal) surgery. 
Tier 3. Five percent of physicians: Major general, abdominal, 
thoracic, plastic, cardiac and gynecological or hand surgery, 
and emergency medicine without major surgery. 
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Tier 4. Eight percent of physicians: Anesthesiology and major 
surgery for emergency medicine, ronco-esophagology, colon and 
rectal, endocrinology, gastroenterology, geriatrics, neoplastic, 
nephrology, laryngology, otology, orhinolaryngology, rhinology, 
and urology. 
Tier 5. Seventy-eight percent of physicians: All other 
physicians, which includes sixty-five practice specialties. 
The Massachusetts study supplied the most detailed data on 
malpractice premiums available. It reported: 
State regulated insurance manual rates for each practice 
specialty; 
Rate differences for six types of policies with varying duration 
of coverage; 
Rate differences based on the maximum dollar amount of 
liability protection; 
Discounts and surcharges to insurance manual rates that 
accurately reflect the actual amount that physicians pay; 
The percentage of physicians purchasing policies with various 
dollar limits on coverage and duration of coverage from 1990 to 
2005. This shows changes in what kind of insurance physicians 
purchase, not just price changes for fixed coverage; and 
Long-term trends and short-term change from 1975 to 2005. 
ProMutual Group raised rates 5 percent in 2006, while in 2007 
it did not increase rates, but instead decreased them for some 
high-risk specialties. 
E. 30-Year Manual Rate Trends for the Five Practice Tiers 
Figure 12 displays as a line graph the $1/$3 million occurrence 
manual rates from 1975 to 2005. Figure 13 displays the numerical 
values. These figures indicate the mean tier rates by averaging the 
rates of each practice specialty group within each tier. This does not 
account for differences in the number of physicians within different 
rate groups. That information will be provided later, but it will only 
include data from 1990 and later because ProMutual Group did not 
have such data prior to that time. 
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Figure 12. Massachusetts mean insurance manual premium rates for $1/$3 
million coverage occurrence policies for all physicians and physicians divided 
into five tiers, adjusted by number of rate groups in each tier; 1975-2005. 
 
 
Source: Medical Professional Insurance Co. 
Notes: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollar. All 
percentages of physicians are for 2005. Practice specialties were divided into 
tiers charged similar rates. 
 
Figure 13. Massachusetts mean manual premium rates for all physicians and 
physicians divided into five tiers for $1/$3 million coverage occurrence policies 
unadjusted by count, 1975-2005. 
 
 
 According to the data, mean insurance manual rates for all 
physicians grew only slightly over 30 years with rise and fall cycles. 
Mean rates increased from $7,095 in 1975, then declined to $5,811 in 
1980 and then rose again to $19,855 in 1990. Rates then declined to 
$13,955 in 1995 before rising to $21,245 in 2005. The five tiers showed 
similar trends with the exception of Tier 1, which included practice 
specialties with the highest risk of liability and premiums. 
Tier 5, which included 78 percent of physicians in 2005, 
experienced smaller rises and declines in the premium cycle than the 
mean for all physicians. Tier 5 rates rose from $3,870 in 1975 to their 
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30-year high of $12,165 in 2005. Tier 5 rates were $10,056 in 1990, its 
second highest year, up from $2,990 in 1980, its lowest year. Tier 4 
rates stayed only slightly higher than the mean for all physicians.  
Tiers 1 through 3 rates were much higher than for most 
physicians, especially in their peak years. Tier 3 and 2 rates soared 
from 1980 to 1990, declined until 1995 or 2000 and increased 
thereafter. In 2005, however, they were lower than in 1990. Between 
1990 and 2005, Tier 2 and Tier 3 rates declined by more than $10,583 
and $5,326, respectively. 
Only Tier 1 rates ended much higher in 2005 than in 1990. 
Although they declined from 1990 to 1995, between 1990 and 2005 the 
mean rate increased by $22,392 to $89,319. 
These data reveal that something atypical is occurring for 
premiums of physicians practicing obstetrics, neurological, and spinal 
surgery. Their premiums are much higher than all other practice 
specialties. If there is any crisis in premiums, then it is for these 
practice specialties, which represent only 4 percent of practicing 
physicians. The data indicate that these practice specialties have 
atypically high premiums.  
The key reason that premiums are higher for these practice 
specialties is that the kind of injuries occurring due to negligence can 
be much more harmful than in other areas. Although giving birth is 
relatively routine and safe for most women and their children, a small 
percentage of infants may be deprived of oxygen during birth, for 
example, and suffer catastrophic injuries. This can result in the infant 
surviving, but also requiring custodial care for the remainder of his or 
her life. Similarly, neurological surgery involving the spine may result 
in injuries leading to paralysis if the surgery goes awry. This too could 
require life-long care.  
 
F. Distribution of Physicians by Dollar Amount of Insurance Manual 
Rates 1990 to 2005 
Another way to analyze the price of liability insurance is to report 
the percentage of physicians charged different rates, separated by 
$10,000 increments. PMG began keeping this data in 1990. Figure 14 
shows the distribution of physicians charged different manual rates 
per $10,000 increments from 1990 to 2005.  
Between 1990 and 2005, physicians with rates under $20,000 
increased from 72 percent to 78 percent. Within this group, physicians 
moved into higher premium levels. Physicians with high premiums—
more than $60,000—decreased from 8 percent to 4 percent. Physicians 
with premiums above $70,000 increased from zero to 4 percent. Those 
in the middle range—$20,000 to $60,000—decreased from 20 percent 
to 17 percent. Within the group as a whole, physicians moved to the 
middle. In 2005, 29 percent of physicians with $1/$3 million 
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occurrence coverage had premiums under $10,000; 78 percent had 
premiums under $20,000; and 92 percent had premiums under 
$40,000. Only 4 percent of physicians had premiums above $50,000.  
In 2005, 23 percent of physicians with $2/$6 million coverage had 
rates under $10,000; 63 percent had rates under $20,000, and 95 
percent had rates under $40,000. Only 5 percent of physicians 
received rates above $40,000, only 1 percent more than $60,000. From 
1990 to 2005, the highest rate group shrank while the lowest rate 
group expanded. 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of physicians by dollar amount of manual premium 
rates, prior to discounts and surcharges, for occurrence policies of $1/$3 
million and $2/$6 million coverage, 1990-2005. 
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G. Adjusting Mean Manual Rates for the Number of Physicians in 
Each Rate Group 
The previous statistics for the five tiers were computed by 
averaging the rates of each group. Some rate groups, however, have 
many more physicians than others. A more accurate measure of 
central tendency would take account of this by weighing the average 
with the number of physicians in each rate group. Figure 15 displays 
mean premiums since 1990 for each tier weighed by the number of 
physicians in each rate group. Again, PMG only has data on the 
number of physicians in each rate group since 1990. 
 
Figure 15. Mean manual premiums for five physician tiers weighted by the 
number of physicians in each rate group for $1/$3 million and $2/$6 million 
occurrence policies, 1990-2005 including percentage of physicians in each tier, 
1990-2005. 
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Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.  
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
Practice specialties divided into tiers charged similar rates. 
 
Between 1990 and 2005, mean premiums for all physicians 
purchasing $1/$3 million occurrence policies decreased from $17,907 
to $17,810. As noted previously, mean premiums for physicians 
collectively were not at an all-time high in 2005—the peak year was 
1990. Premiums fell thereafter until 2000 before rising again to the 
amount charged in 2005.  
Mean premiums in Tiers 5 and 4 also cycled down and up and 
ultimately rose just over $1,250 and $1,040, respectively, from 1990 to 
2005. Rates for Tiers 1 through 3 were much higher than for most 
physicians, especially at their peaks. Tier 2 and Tier 3 rates declined 
until 1995 or 2000 and increased thereafter. Still, in 2005, those rates 
were lower than in 1990. Tier 2 and Tier 3 premiums declined by 
more than $5,375 and $7,526, respectively, between 1990 and 2005 
and ended at $44,289 and $36,557. Only Tier 1 premiums were much 
higher in 2005 than in 1990. Tier 1 premiums increased from $28,825 
in 1990 to $95,045 in 2005. Trends are similar for $2/$6 million 
coverage, with the exception of Tier 4 premiums which decreased 
from 1990 to 2005.  
To summarize, these data support the previous findings: Premium 
rates for most physicians were not high and, in fact, declined from 
1990 to 2005. However, physicians practicing obstetrics, neurological, 
or spinal surgery are the exception; they paid much higher premiums 
than all other physicians and their mean rates increased from 1990 to 
2005. 
H. Relation of Reported Premiums to Premiums of Other Policies 
How do the premiums for the $1/$3 million and $2/$6 million 
occurrence policies just analyzed differ from the premiums of other 
policies? 
Figure 16 shows 2005 premiums for PMG’s 19 rate groups under 
$1/$3 million coverage and the percentage of physicians purchasing 
such policies from 1990 to 2005. Occurrence policies in 2005 cost 
$3,473 more than first-year claims-made coverage for rate group 1 and 
$65,740 more for rate group 19. Comparing mature claims-made 
premiums to occurrence policies, the former were $375 more than in 
rate group 1 and $7,763 more in rate group 19.  
 
 
 
 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
210 
Figure 16. 2005 manual premium rates in dollars for first-year claims-made—
mature claims-made policies and occurrence policies for $1/$3 million coverage. 
percentage distribution of physicians purchasing occurrence policies by rate 
group, 1990-2005. 
 
Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co. 
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars. 
 
I. How Manual Rate Discounts and Surcharges Affect the Premiums 
Physicians Pay 
After 1990, insurance manual rates became a less reliable measure 
of the amounts that physicians paid for insurance because PMG 
began to discount or surcharge rates. Initially, PMG discounted 
premiums for only some physicians. Around 2000 it increased the size 
and frequency of these discounts and started to impose rate 
surcharges for some high-risk physicians—nearly all physicians who 
were not high-risk received some discount, frequently around 5 
percent, but some received much larger discounts than others. By 
2000, however, PMG began increasing discount frequency and size as 
well as surcharging physicians.  
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In 2005, PMG discounted 88.7 percent of policies.143 Sixty-five 
percent of physicians received discounts between zero and 25 percent 
while 23.6 percent received discounts between 25 percent and 50 
percent. PMG also surcharged rates for 6 percent of physicians. Four-
and-a-half percent of physicians paid surcharges under 25 percent and 
1.4 percent paid surcharges above 25 percent. Adjusting the Tier 1 
premiums for discounts and surcharges, physicians paying more than 
$70,000 fell from 4 percent to 2.7 percent; 1.1 percent paid $60,000 to 
70,000, and 0.1 percent paid $50,000 to $60,000.  
In 2005, 66.7 percent of all $1/$3 million occurrence policies were 
discounted by more than 12 percent. Reducing 2005 rates by just over 
12 percent for Tier 5, and by only 5 percent for Tier 4, resulted in 
lower premiums than in 1990. Consequently, premiums for most 
physicians in Tiers 4 and 5 were lower in 2005 than in 1990. Mean 
rates for Tiers 2 and 3 were lower in 2005 than in 1990 even before 
adjusting for discounts and surcharges. Tier 1, however, continued to 
be the exception, having a higher mean premium in 2005 than in 1990 
even after adjusting for its mean discount of $11,014.  
As the above analysis makes clear, after adjusting for discounts, 
nearly all physicians in Tiers 2, 3, and 4 paid lower premiums in 2005 
than they did in 1990. So, if premiums were actually a burden on 
practice income, they were a greater problem in 1990 than at any 
point between 1990 and 2005.  
But what about Tier 1 physicians? Could they have experienced a 
premium crisis? 
 
143. PMG discounted rates in 2005 as follows:  
 Interns, residents, and fellows working in a facility insured by 
PMG: 25% or 15%; 
 Physicians in first and second year practice: 50% and 25%; 
 Physicians in academic settings or community service treating 
patients 21 hours a week or less: 50%; 
 Emergency medicine physicians: up to 20%; 
 Physicians covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act: between 25% 
and 50%; and 
 PMG reduced premiums additionally up to 25% for physicians 
deemed low-risk and surcharged physicians deemed high-risk up to 
25%. Physicians with no closed claims over $10,000 received 
discounts between 3% and 15%, based on the duration of clean 
claims. Group practices with a favorable claims history also 
received discounts. 
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J. Obstetrics and Other Tier 1 Practice Specialties 
Figures 17 and 18 reveal premium variations in Tier 1. Figure 17 
displays dollar values for each of the Tier 1 practice specialties’ mean 
and median manual rates, mean premiums adjusted by discounts and 
surcharges, and the lowest and highest premiums paid in 2000 and 
2005. Figure 18 displays the percentage of physicians who received 
discounts in each of Tier 1’s specialties in 2000 and 2005. 
According to the data, premiums for Tier 1 physicians with $1/$3 
million coverage varied widely in 2005. The OB/GYN manual rate 
was $97,243, about $8,700 more than its 1990 level. Depending on 
rate-adjustment, however, OB/GYN premiums ranged from $48,622 
to $145,865. Few Tier 1 physicians purchased $2/$6 million coverage 
in 2005. But nearly all OB/GYNs with $2/$6 million coverage paid 
the insurance manual rate with more paying surcharges than receiving 
discounts.  
Since 1990, the highest rates were for OB/GYNs. To examine 
OB/GYN premiums in more detail, the Massachusetts study 
supplemented OB/GYN occurrence data with claims-made data. 
Figure 19 displays insurance manual rates, mean premiums adjusted 
by discounts and surcharges, the lowest and highest premiums paid, 
and the percentage of physicians who paid these rates for all $1/$3 
million occurrence policies in 2000 and 2005. The data for $2/$6 
occurrence was not reported since only 20 policies for this coverage 
were purchased, and that sample size is too small for any meaningful 
comparison. 
In 2000, OB/GYN occurrence rates were $69,361, about $275 
more than 1990 rates. Due to discounts and surcharges, however, 88 
percent of OB/GYN’s paid less than in 1990. Claims-made premiums 
reveal similar patterns as mean weighted premiums were lower than 
in 1990. By 2005, only 3 percent of OB/GYNs with occurrence 
policies paid the manual rate of $97,243 and twenty-nine percent paid 
less than the 1990 rate. Between 53 percent and 76.2 percent of 
OB/GYNs purchasing first year through fourth year claims-made 
policies received discounts, yet most paid more than 1990 rates. 
Premiums varied greatly: The highest were more than twice the 
lowest.  
In summary, nearly all of the 97 percent of physicians in Tiers 2 
through 5 paid lower premiums in 2005 than in 1990. Concerns that 
premiums are higher now than ever before are clearly unfounded. 
Only a few selective practice specialties appear to pay higher 
premiums. Even so, the premiums of the three practice specialties in 
the highest rate tier reveal great variation in premiums paid—some 
had substantial premium increases since 1990 while for others, 
premiums declined. For OB/GYNs, the practice specialty with the 
highest premiums, the most costly year for all physicians was not 
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2005. During that year, nearly a third of those physicians paid less 
than they did in 1990.  
 
Figure 17. Top three practice specialty manual premium rates and mean, 
median, low, and high premiums adjusted for discounts and surcharges for 
$1/$3 million and $2/$6 million occurrence policies. 
 
Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.  
Note: All data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant 
2005 dollars.  
*Ortho/Spinal: Orthopedics performing spinal surgery;  
**OB/GYN includes OB/major surgery. 
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Figure 18. Percentage distribution of physicians receiving various discounts 
and surcharges in top three practice specialties, for $1/$3 million and $2/$6 
million occurrence policies, 2000-2005. 
 
Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.  
Note: Ortho/Spinal: Orthopedics performing spinal surgery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
215 
Figure 19. OB/GYN manual rates and mean, low, and high premiums 
adjusted for discounts and surcharges, for 2000 and 2005 for $1/$3 million 
first year through mature claims-made and occurrence policies, 1990 manual 
rates. 
 
Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.  
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.  
CM: Claims made. 
 
K. An Unrecognized Factor Leading to Selective Increases in 
Premiums 
Premiums did not increase uniformly for high-risk physicians in 
the years following 1990; rather, they declined for nearly a third of 
physicians and increased substantially for most of the others. There is 
another factor not generally recognized that explains this phenomena: 
changes in medical underwriting. After 1990, PMG extended 
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underwriting within practice specialties through premium discounts 
and surcharges based on individual risk factors. It reduced premiums 
for lower risk physicians and increased them for those with higher 
risks.  
Physicians within Tier 1 paid identical premiums in 1990; by 
2005, however, their premiums varied three-fold. In 2005, nearly one-
third of OB/GYNs paid less than 1990 rates while 28 percent paid 
$28,150 or more than 1990 rates. Refining risk ratings contributed 
significantly to the increased premiums for high-risk OB/GYNs, while 
it lowered premiums for lower risk OB/GYNs. As a result, the cost of 
insurers lowering premiums for some OB/GYNs was a higher 
premium for high risk OB/GYNs.  
If PMG changed all OB/GYNs the same amount in 2005, 
averaging high and low premiums and all discounts and surcharges, 
rates would have increased for this specialty by less than $16,900 
since 1990.144 By both differentiating risk and charging premiums 
according to risk, premiums in 2005 instead varied between $48,621 (a 
decrease of $20,465 from 1990) and $145,865 (an increase of $76,780 
since 1990). When OB/GYNs seeking lower premiums compelled 
insurers to compete for business, PMG lowered premiums for low risk 
OB/GYNs. Those low risk OB/GYNs then stopped subsidizing high-
risk OB/GYNs. The result? Lower premiums for a few OB/GYNs, 
somewhat higher premiums for most, and much higher premiums for a 
few. In short, one reason that premiums increased for some 
OB/GYNs, is that insurers sought to price individual policies based 
on assessed risk rather than to spread that risk across all OB/ GYNs 
as a group. 
In 2005, 21 percent of OB/GYNs paid rate surcharges. Eight 
percent paid a 10 percent surcharge, 7 percent paid a 20 percent 
surcharge, 3 percent paid a 30 percent surcharge, and 3 percent paid 
either a 40 percent or 50 percent surcharge. Furthermore, 76 percent 
of OB/GYNs received discounts. Twenty-one percent of OB/GYNs 
received a 10 percent discount, 26 percent received a 20 percent 
discount, 27 percent received a 30 percent discount, and 2 percent 
received a 50 percent discount. 
Insurers in other markets often employ individual risk rating. 
Health insurers that sell individual policies typically use risk rating, 
charging steep premiums to high-risk individuals or denying them 
coverage altogether. Most people, however, obtain health insurance 
through employers, which spreads the risk across all employees and 
makes insurance affordable for high-risk individuals. Enterprise 
 
144. This number is obtained by taking the 2005 mean discount-and-
surcharge-adjusted premium for $1M/$3M occurrence policies ($85,970) 
and subtracting the 1990 manual rate ($69,970) for $1M/$3M 
occurrence policies. See Figure 19 supra.  
Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015  
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice 
Insurance Premiums Fall 
217 
liability is an equivalent mechanism to pool risk and subsidize high-
risk individuals for malpractice insurance. It shifts legal and financial 
responsibility from individual physicians to organizations such as 
hospitals. 
L. Changes in Policies Purchased 
The analysis so far is of pure price increases and decreases for a 
constant product, namely insurance policies for a set dollar amount of 
coverage. Another reason for rising or decreasing expenditures is that 
people may purchase different products. When considering claims that 
premium costs are out of control, it is important to define what the 
product is that physicians are purchasing and whether the product 
has changed.  
Car prices, for example, can increase because the manufacturer or 
dealers choose to charge more or because the kind of car people 
purchase changes over time. Consider cars throughout the last several 
decades: They have added features such as air-bag restraint systems, 
antilock brakes, catalytic converters to reduce harmful emissions, and 
computer chips to manage various functions. Manufacturers also 
redesigned engines to make cars more fuel efficient, changed the 
design and components to make them safer, and made numerous 
other changes in the material used and in the design.  
In comparing cars of the past with those of today we need to 
consider the reasons for the price change: is it due to specific changes 
in the product, or has the price changed despite the product 
remaining the same? When purchasing professional liability insurance, 
the product is a defined dollar amount of liability protection for a 
certain period. Insurers have not significantly changed the 
configuration of their policies, and as a result, it is much easier to 
gauge pure price increase over time.  
Furthermore, physicians may purchase a greater dollar level of 
coverage today than in the past, which increases the amount they 
pay, even if the price of the policy remains constant. They may 
purchase greater coverage because they risk greater liability, or 
because they are obliged to do so by state laws or hospitals as a 
condition for having practice privileges. They may also purchase 
higher dollar amounts of coverage on their own to obtain greater 
protection.  
It is worth noting that the increased dollar amounts of liability 
protection do not cost proportionately more. This is because the 
probability of the physician being held liable does not increase based 
on the policy purchased. Further, physicians found liable for 
malpractice are not usually liable for the maximum amount of their 
policy.  
Since 1975 the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine 
required physicians to purchase up to $100,000 coverage per claim, 
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capped at a $300,000 yearly loss.145 Nevertheless, the most commonly 
purchased policy is $1/$3 million. Between 1990 and 2005, many 
physicians increased coverage limits and paid more for the new 
policies. Figure 20 displays the distribution of all policies by type and 
dollar coverage from 1990 to 2005. Physicians purchasing $1/$3 
million policies decreased from 71.3 percent to 67.4 percent; those 
purchasing $2/$6 million policies jumped from 8.4 percent to 30.3 
percent.  
Physicians also switched to less expensive policy types. Those 
purchasing mature claims-made policies—the most expensive 
category—fell from 25.4 percent to 10.7 percent. Physicians 
purchasing occurrence policies—the second most expensive type—
increased from 72.6 to 83.2 percent. Physicians with first-year through 
fourth-year claims-made policies increased from 2 to 6 percent. 
Purchasing less expensive types of policies, however, is different. Since 
such changes are based on the duration of time covered, physicians 
would need to purchase other policies over that time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07 (16) (1987). Many states do not require 
physicians to purchase malpractice liability insurance and many states 
that do require that they purchase a low level of coverage. See Hyman 
et al., supra note 11, at 55. 
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Figure 20. Estimate, distribution of polices sold by dollar amount of 
coverage and by major types of policy, 1990-2005. 
 
How should we interpret changes in the kind of insurance policies 
that physicians purchase, particularly increases in the dollar amount 
of liability coverage? When physicians are compelled to purchase 
greater amounts of liability protection clearly that is a cost of practice 
they cannot avoid. In this case, it makes sense to consider such cost 
increases as an increased cost of practice even if the price of insurance 
has not increased. We can summarize this by saying that physicians 
needed to purchase greater levels of liability coverage to practice 
medicine.  
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But what about physicians who purchase greater amounts of 
liability protection even though they are not required to by state law, 
hospital policy, or other rules? If physicians need more protection 
because awards are higher and they cannot reasonably practice with 
the same amount of coverage as they did previously, it seems 
reasonable to take account of that also. If all or most physicians 
purchased greater dollar levels of liability protection, then it seems 
prudent to assume these physicians generally needed to purchase more 
insurance. But if over time only a small percentage of physicians 
purchase greater coverage, then it would be unreasonable to assume 
physicians need that extra insurance. Instead, their purchases should 
be considered as a reflection of their preferences, risk aversion, or 
other factors. 
M. Comparison of ProMutual Group Premiums to Premiums of Other 
Insurers 
As noted, the PMG dominates the Massachusetts Professional 
Liability Insurance Market outside of Harvard’s CRICO. Its large size 
suggests that the bulk of its policies reflect what most physicians in 
the state pay. Still, if PMG’s physicians had lower risk than other 
insurers, then its premiums might understate the prices paid by those 
other physicians. The evidence, however, suggests that this is 
unlikely. Indeed, there are strong grounds to assert that PMG’s 
premiums are higher than other insurers, especially for high-risk 
physicians. 
First, PMG cannot effectively preclude high-risk physicians. 
Massachusetts regulations prohibit insurers from refusing any 
applicant. It is true that Massachusetts insurers can cede risk and 
insurance premiums to a state mandated reinsurance program for any 
policy holder they do not wish to cover. The program would then 
divide the costs among insurers based on respective market shares. 
But ProMutual Group possesses between 88 and 91 percent of the 
market and would bear that portion of the cost regardless. Therefore, 
even if PMG cedes risk to the state pool, it would save very little 
money by doing so. The opposite is true of insurers who have a small 
market share. Since its start in 1995, the reinsurance plan included 
between zero and 10 percent of insurance sales. 
Second, evidence suggests that PMG charges higher premiums 
than its competitors for physicians such as OB/GYNs. Two regulated 
insurers—Medical Protective and Connecticut Medical Insurance 
Company—appear to have developed niche markets by selling 
insurance to specialties that they believe are overcharged. In 2005, 
Medical Protective set lower rates than PMG: 14 percent, or $5,850, 
less for orthopedists and 11 percent, or $11,602, less for OB/GYNs. 
Still, the price that physicians actually paid is not publicly known 
because insurers do not disclose details about discounts and 
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surcharges. Indeed, these insurers may sell insurance selectively to 
physicians with lower than normal risk for their practice specialty.  
It also appears that some high-risk physicians have declined 
insurance from the ProMutual Group to purchase it at a lower price 
from other insurers. PMG analyzed Board of Registration of Medicine 
data in 1997 and found that OB/GYNs comprised 4 percent of 
Massachusetts physicians, the same amount as its policyholders. 
Between 2000 and 2005, however, the number of OB/GYNs that 
purchased insurance from PMG declined from 242 to 182 for $1/$3 
million coverage and from 55 to 20 for $2/$6 million coverage.  
Similarly, PMG’s physicians in the top rate group for $1/$3 
million occurrence policies decreased from 4.4 percent in 1995 to 3.2 
percent in 2005. Tier 1 represented 8 percent of PMG’s physicians in 
1990 but only 4 percent in 2005. The percentage of PMG’s business 
that included high-risk physicians also decreased as other insurers 
sought a niche market for such physicians by offering them lower 
premiums. This data suggests that some physicians switched from 
ProMutual Group to its competitors to reduce their premiums. 
Physicians in PMG’s highest rate group are also likely to pay at 
least as much as similar physicians insured by risk-retention groups or 
offshore companies. Physicians choose such unregulated insurance to 
pay lower premiums. Otherwise, they would be incurring greater risk 
by purchasing insurance with lower financial reserves and less state 
regulatory protection without receiving any financial advantage.  
CRICO also probably charges lower premiums to its physicians 
than is available on the open market. If it does not, then Harvard 
receives no financial benefit from creating this self-insurance pool, but 
it incurs significant administrative burden and financial risk. 
N. What Causes Premiums to Rise or Fall? 
Many physicians think that rises in liability insurance premiums 
are due to increases in either the number of malpractice lawsuits or 
the number and size of court awards and out of court settlements. 
That is not an unreasonable inference, but it misses other causes. 
Over the long term, premiums must reflect the costs of malpractice 
liability that insurance companies pay. However, in the short term, 
changes in premiums are more closely related to market competition, 
the interest rate earned by insurers on their investments, and insurers’ 
predictions about risk. Indeed, careful economic analysis reveals that 
there are cycles of rises and falls in premiums for all categories of 
insurance, which insurance analysts call underwriting cycles.146  
Underwriting cycles are partly due to the long delay between 
when physicians purchase policies and when insurers incur loss. This 
 
146. Baker, supra note 59, at 396. 
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increases uncertainty and complicates accurate pricing of insurance 
risk. Market competition induces insurers to lower premiums to 
increase their market share until they revise upward predictions of 
future liabilities and reserve needs. Insurers then increase premiums 
sharply to make up for liabilities incurred several years before based 
on more optimistic estimates.  
Changes in the investment climate also contribute to underwriting 
cycles. As interest rates rise, so does insurer income from reserves. 
When interest rates decline, insurer investment income falls.147 When 
insurer investment income declines, insurers typically raise premiums. 
And when insurer investment income increases, insurers typically 
lower premiums to increase their book of business. The result: 
underwriting market cycles. In what analysts refer to as hard markets, 
insurers carefully select risks, increase reserves, and raise premiums. 
During what analysts refer to as soft markets, insurers assume more 
risk, decrease reserves, and lower premiums. For instance, studies 
have shown that malpractice premiums rose in Texas in the 1980s and 
early 2000 because insurers changed long-term loss predictions and 
the investment climate soured, not because claims or awards increased 
in size or frequency.148 
V. Why the Crisis Persists 
A. Physicians Mistakenly Perceive a Crisis 
Physicians and casual observers often conclude that there is a 
medical malpractice premium crisis because they rely on unreliable 
data or misinterpret accurate data. The most frequently reported data 
on malpractice premiums comes from the Medical Liability Monitor 
Reporter which reports average changes in premiums without 
distinguishing between the prices of premiums in different policies due 
to the dollar amount of coverage purchased, which of seven categories 
of policies are purchased, or the time period for which the physician is 
covered.  
Most observers focus on the highest risk specialties. They believe 
the premiums for obstetricians and one or two other high-risk 
specialties represent what all other physicians pay. They do not 
understand that these high-risk practice premiums are atypical. 
Furthermore, many physicians and observers look at the premium 
rates published in the insurance manual, but in fact, insurers typically 
discount those rates for most physicians. Physicians also often fail to 
adjust for inflation, and therefore they exaggerate any premium 
 
147. Kurt Karl et al., Capital Markets and Insurance Cycles, 4 J. RISK FIN. 
40, 40-46 (2003). 
148. Black, supra note 88, at 253. 
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increases that do exist. They forget to incorporate the periods of time 
during which premiums remained about the same or decreased. Thus, 
to many physicians, it appears that their premiums increase steadily 
when in fact there were cycles of rises and falls.  
Furthermore, press reports often dramatize premium increases by 
reporting percentage increases rather than changes in the dollar 
amount that a physician pays. It sounds more dramatic to report that 
a physician’s premium increased 10 percent or 20 percent than to 
report that the premiums increased by $2,000 or $4,000, often just a 
small fraction of the total premium amount.  
The psychology of malpractice also prompts physicians to perceive 
a crisis. Being sued is traumatic. Even when courts decide they are 
not liable, sparing them financial loss, physicians incur high emotional 
costs. The fear of being sued again imposes a psychological toll.149 The 
risk of being held liable for negligence challenges the physician’s self-
image and sense of professional competence, and that causes cognitive 
dissonance.  
It should come as no surprise that many physicians perceive the 
risk of liability as a major burden, even when their own premiums are 
a small part of their practice’s expense. Fear of malpractice may even 
skew physicians’ perception of how much they pay for liability 
insurance. When physicians are financially squeezed they might 
perceive malpractice premiums to be the culprit. In fact, when a 
physician’s income does not grow, fails to keep up with inflation, or 
declines altogether, the problem is not usually due to malpractice 
premiums; rather, the problem is more typically due to health insurers 
that clamp down on the size of physician fees and deny payment for 
services that they deem unnecessary. Malpractice premiums can be a 
convenient scapegoat for frustrated physicians.150 
 
149. See, e.g., Sara C. Charles, Jeffrey R. Wilbert, & J. Franke, Sued and 
Nonsued Physicians’ Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice 
Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437, 437 (1985) (discussing whether 
reactions reporting are unique to physicians being sued); see Sara C. 
Charles, Coping With a Medical Malpractice Suit, 174 W. J. MED. 55, 
55 (2001). 
150. The risk of liability also helps physicians justify their entrepreneurial 
practices that boost their income with little or no benefit to patients. 
Physicians often challenge insurers denial of payment by arguing that 
they need to perform those tests, exams, and services in order to protect 
themselves from malpractice liability. In fact, physicians typically 
receive income from performing those tests that have marginal or no 
value, while the risk of liability for not preforming them is small and 
remote. 
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B. Key Actors Have an Interest in Maintaining the Perception of a 
Crisis 
A real medical malpractice crisis serves no one’s interest, yet the 
perception of a crisis advances the agenda of certain actors. Many of 
these actors promote the impression that a premium crisis exists or do 
nothing to correct that misperception. Let us review how the AMA, 
the tort reform lobby, politicians, the media, and health law and 
policy researchers benefit from the perception of a crisis. 
Although the AMA is the oldest organization representing 
physicians in the United States, its authority and membership has 
declined from its peak in the 1950s when it included about 60 percent 
of all U.S. physicians. Today less than one-third of practicing 
physicians are members, and numerous other physician organizations 
have grown to represent the divergent interests of various practice 
specialties.151 This presents a problem for the AMA, which needs to 
maintain membership support and revenue to survive.  
As the AMA searches for ways to convince physicians to become 
or remain members, it has focused on the legal reform of medical 
liability. Medical malpractice is a consensus issue. The AMA’s call to 
protect physicians from liability unites physicians more than any of 
its other proposals.  
If physicians ceased to perceive medical malpractice as a pressing 
problem, that would undercut the value of one of the AMA’s most 
visible campaigns. The motivation for physicians to join the 
organization would be reduced. It is therefore in the AMA’s interest 
to maintain the perception of a medical malpractice crisis. That helps 
explain why the AMA cries crisis when malpractice premiums rise but 
does not publicize the declines in premiums. It also helps explain why 
the AMA opposed the Clinton administration’s enterprise liability 
proposal, which would have made hospitals liable for any negligence 
of hospital-based physicians. The proposal would have removed 
physician liability, ending the AMA’s need to lobby for reform of 
medical liability law. 
Rallying under the banner of “tort reform,” a segment of 
American businesses seek to reduce the legal responsibility of 
corporations for harms caused by their economic activities. The 
organizations funded to advance this agenda want to restrict the 
ability of injured individuals to file lawsuits, restrict juries from 
awarding punitive damages, and cap the amount of compensation 
 
151. See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS: 
PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993) (discussing the AMAs 
growth and policies); MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND 
THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND JAPAN 
(2011). 
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that juries can require firms to pay. These organizations also try to 
mobilize public opinion through the media, lobby legislators, and 
bring lawsuits to change liability rules. 
These organizations, however, face a significant obstacle. A large 
segment of the public is unsympathetic to the interests of 
corporations and empathizes with individuals who are harmed by 
corporate action. These organizations therefore try to bolster popular 
support for their agenda by building coalitions with physicians seeking 
to change medical liability rules. They know that the public is more 
sympathetic to doctors than to corporations, and they believe that 
they can advance their aims by framing their agenda as reform of 
liability law in general rather than only for corporations. The tort 
reform lobby benefits when the public believes there is a medical 
malpractice premium crisis because crisis—however fabricated—is 
more likely to result in broader changes to tort law.  
Politicians benefit from the perception of a malpractice crisis 
because it creates an easy way for them to garner electoral support 
with little political risk. Candidates for office can please most 
physicians by giving a speech supporting the reform of medical 
liability law whereas taking a stand on physician payment, health 
insurance, or other health policy issues are likely to divide physicians 
and lose votes. In addition, changes in medical liability law would not 
require tax increases or cuts in government programs, making it an 
even more attractive political stance. National candidates cannot be 
blamed for not producing legislative relief after elections because 
ultimately it is the states, not the federal government, that have 
jurisdiction over medical malpractice law. 
George Bush backed medical malpractice reform in his 
presidential bids in 2000 and 2004.152 Barack Obama also spoke in 
favor of reform, but used a more nuanced approach. Rather than 
support caps on awards, he promoted the use of projects in interested 
states to demonstrate the feasibility of alternatives to the litigation to 
resolve medical malpractice claims.153 And in response, when Congress 
drafted the Affordable Care Act, it included small federal grants to 
 
152. U.S. President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Discussion on 
Medical Liability Reform in Collinsville, Illinois, 10 (Jan 5, 2005), 
available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CP
D. See also Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits; President 
Says “Junk’” Litigation Is Driving Small-Town Doctors Out of Business, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A50603-2005Jan5.html. 
153. U.S. President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the 
Congress on Health Care Reform, 7 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CP
D. 
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support and evaluate demonstration projects in states that were 
interested in such experiments.154  
Many journalists meanwhile like to write stories on the 
malpractice premium crisis because the topic appeals to general 
readerships. Editors are more likely to publish reports of a crisis than 
reports showing little or no change in premiums or analysis that is 
complex and inconclusive. Dry information and complex economic and 
social analysis do not make catchy headlines, hook readers, or sell 
papers. But reports of a crisis often do.  
It is also an easy story to write. Simply report misleading 
numbers on rising premiums and sprinkle the text with quotes from 
the many physicians who complain about their rates or threaten to 
leave practice as a result of high premiums. Armed with a quotation 
from a physician stating how premiums affected his practice, reporters 
rarely feel they need to check how those premiums affect the 
physician’s overall practice costs or income. Nor do many of these 
journalists ask whether the physicians would have retired early even if 
premiums had not increased, or whether the early retirement was due 
to physicians having earned enough money from their practice to 
build a sizable nest egg. 
Good scholars should not skew their research results. Yet all 
policy scholars have a common bias—they believe that what they 
study is important. It is to be expected then that policy scholars who 
write on medical malpractice portray medical malpractice as a 
pressing problem or a crisis. Why else should anyone fund their 
research or read their studies? Malpractice researchers often differ in 
their assessment of the effect of current policies and the policies they 
recommend, but generally maintain that there is a crisis. Because it 
benefits those who write about medical malpractice for the 
policymakers and the public to believe that there is a malpractice 
crisis, we should not expect malpractice researchers to proclaim that 
there is not much of a problem. There is just too much incentive to 
claim otherwise. 
 
 
154. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Implementing Hospital-based 
Communication-and-resolution Programs: Lessons Learned in New York 
City, 33 HEALTH AFF. 30, 30 (2014) (providing the results of one 
demonstration project with five New York City hospitals).  
 
